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Abstract 
A Structural Adjustment Programme is typically accompanied by fiscal policy 
changes aimed at reducing government spending and budget deficits as in India in 
recent years. The objective of this thesis is to analyse the impact of these changes on 
the economy. Since the eventual disengagement of indebted countries from 
international lending agencies like the RV1F and the World Bank has been seen to come 
with econon-uc growth which is one of the objectives of the SAP, and as small 
differences in the long-run growth rate have a significant impact on standards of living, 
our focus is on the effect of government spending policies on the long-run steady state 
growth rate. We present an endogenous growth model in which the impact of fiscal 
policy is through non-Ricardian effects on the demand side and externalities arising 
from public capital on the supply side. 
Preliminary results suggest that the Indian economy is non-Ricardian. An 
aggregate consumption function that incorporates finite horizons, population growth, 
liquidity constraints and tax distortions is estimated investigate non-Ricardian effects 
on demand. With supply side parameters that are observed or imposed, the model is 
calibrated to examine the impact of changes in the debt/GDP ratio, the tax rate and the 
share of development expenditure in total goverrunent spending. Simulations suggest a 
very strong positive impact of public investment on the long-run growth rate. At the 
same time our analysis shows that non-Ricardian demand side effects though present, 
have only a marginal effect on our empirical analysis. The major policy implication that 
emerges from our results is that the present trend of a decline in the proportion of 
development spending is counter-productive to the objective of growth. A clear 
definition of the role of public investment and an analysis of the impact of the 
components of public expenditure is essential for a successful SAP. 
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Introduction 
In advanced industriahsed countries the role of fiscal poficy has traditionafly been 
seen to be one of demand management. Govemment tax and spending decisions are 
considered to be instruments for correcting short-term macroeconomic imbalances. Though 
public expenditure has been an important tool to promote economic growth in developing 
countries , its role as such did not find a place in models of economic growth. Recent 
developments in macroeconomics provide us with a framework for analysing the impact of 
fiscal policy on long-run growth. In this study we analyse the effect on econon& growth of 
fiscal changes that typically accompany a structural adjustment programme. 
A large external debt and persistent current account deficits create circumstances 
under which a country borrows from international lending agencies like the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The RVT views the causes of external imbalance to he 
in the divergence between aggregate demand and supply. This divergence is traced to 
inappropriate policies that expand aggregate demand too rapidly relative to the growth of 
productive capacity in the economy. To rectify this situation, the country concerned 
undertakes a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). The programme consists of policy 
measures to be adopted by the borrowing country and the disbursement of each successive 
stage of the loan is conditional upon the government adopting these measures. 
The broad objectives of a SAP are the attainment of a viable balance of payments, 
satisfactory long term growth performance and low inflation. Apart from monetary and 
exchange rate policies, a typical SAP includes fiscal measures. The aim of a SAP Is both to 
reduce demand, especially in the short run, and to increase supply. Under a SAP fiscal 
1) 
measures are treated as instruments of demand management. This treatment is typical of the 
approach that fiscal policy affects aggregate demand and levels of consumption, saving, 
investment and output, but leaves their long-run growth rates unaffected. The long-run 
growth rate is determined exogenously. It may, for instance, depend on the rate of technical 
progress which is assumed to be determined,, not by actiVity within the economy, but, say, 
as a function of time. There is no role for fiscal policy in the detem-dnation of the long-run 
growth rate in such models. 
Recently the belief that the crucial issue is growth rather than busMiess cycles and 
the counter cyclical fiscal and monetary policies of the government, has shifted the focus of 
macroeconomics to growth. A boom in research tin the area has found explanations of 
growth in various factors such that growth is endogenous. The engine of growth may be 
learning by doing or research and development that leads to the creation and accumulation 
of knowledge, externalities associated with private or public capital or human capital that 
anses from education and training. In endogenous growth theory government policy which 
influences these factors has an important role to play in determining the long-run growth 
rate of the economy. The basic premise of this study is similar to that which has motivated 
research on econornic growth since the mid 1980s - that the deterrmnants of the long-run 
econornic growth rate, are crucial because even small differences in growth rates, when 
cumulated over a generation or more, have much greater consequences for standards of 
living than the kinds of short-term business fluctuations that have typlcaUy occupied most 
of the attention of macroecononusts (Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)). 
It has also been seen that the eventual disengagement from the 1W comes With 
sustained growth (Bird (1993)). We therefore focus on the objective of growth rather than 
macroeconornic balance. An understanding of the effect of government poficles that have 
even smafl effects on the long-run growth rate may prove to be eventuafly more significant 
than policies that aun to correct short-term macro economic imbalances. We here attempt 
to study the effects on growth of changes in government policy. In the present context, 
endogenous growth models provide us with the fi7amework for analysing the effect on long- 
run growth of the conditionalities intended for demand management. 
Our methodology is to study a country currently undergoing a typical Structural 
Adjustment Programme - India. In the 1980s, the growth of public expenditure in India 
was higher than the growth of revenue. A large part of the increase was in current 
government expenditure. While the 1970s typically witnessed balanced revenue accounts, 
the 1980s saw chronic budget deficits. The eighties also saw a rise in the current account 
deficit and a large external debt which assumed crisis proportions by mid-1991. India 
turned to the ME and World Bank for loans. The government corarnitted itself to a 
Structural Adjustment Progran-ime. This commitment is detailed in the Government of 
India's letters of intent to the Rv1F and World Bank. Apart from many measures relating to 
industrial, export-import, investment, foreign capital and other policies, the government 
accepted the loan conditionality relating to fiscal measures. These included a reduction in 
fiscal deficits, government spending and tax rates. 
Under the SAP the role of fiscal policy was clearly perceived to be one of demand 
management. This was regardless of the fact that in India policy makers have considered 
fiscal pol-icy crucial in promoting econonuc growth. Left to the private sector, it was 
believed, there would be little investment in infrastructure, education etc., and economic 
growth would be slow. The role of the public sector, as envisaged by the planners, was 
complementary to the private sector. The govenu-nent invested in industries and sectors 
where the private sector was unwilling to invest but which were crucial for econornic 
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growth. Even today nearly half of government spending consists of such 'development' 
expenditure. However, over the last few years, especially under the SAP, the proportion of 
development expenditure in total government spending has been falling. Since it is 
politically much more difficult to cut current consumption expenditure, the government can 
meet its commitment of cutting the deficit and spending by cutting pubtic investment. 
If public investment affects the long-run growth rate of output then ignoring its role 
may lead to results contrary to the objectives of the SAP. We, therefore, study the effects 
not only of changes in the tax rate or the debt/GDP ratio that are intended to meet loan 
conditionalities, but also changes in the proportion of public investment in total government 
spending, a fal-l-out of the government's commitment to the IW and the World Bank. The 
fi7amework of an endogenous growth model allows us to analyse the impact of these fiscal 
variables on the long-run growth rate. 
Another development in macroeconomics that helps us analyse the case of a 
developing country more accurately is the modelling of non-Ricardian effects on 
consumption. The simple crowding-out hypothesis was negated by the Ricardian 
Equivalence theorem which defined conditions under which there would be no crowding- 
out at all. It contested the view that public debt would always crowd out private spending. 
The hypothesis was shown to hold only under certain assumptions that included infinite 
horizons or the operation of an inter-generational bequest rnechanisn-ý an absence of 
liquidity constraints, lump sum taxes, no population growth and forward looking rational 
consumers who understand the government's intertemporal budget constraint. Since the 
Ricardian theorem was true under only very strict assumptions, the foHowmg debate on the 
effect of debt focused on how the violation of each of its assumptions led to a deviation 
from the equivalence between taxes and debt. Though the conclusion was that of the 
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traditional view, the analysis was rigorous, the techniques Improved and the causes of 
crowding out clearly defined. 
In a developing country, Ricardian assumptions of infinite horizons, peffect credit 
markets, no population growth and non-distortionary taxes are unlikely to be satisfied. 
Fol. lowing Hayashi (1982), Blanchard (1985) and Weil (1989) we introduce liquidity 
constraints, finite horizons and population growth into the modelling of consumer 
behaviour in the economy. To take account of structural changes that accompany the 
process of development, we allow for income redistribution. A discrete time model 
following Frenkel and Razin (1992) provides an estimable form of the consumption 
function. 
We use the Generafized Method of Moments to examine non-Ricardian effects on 
consumption. Proposed by Hansen (1982), this method has recently been employed for 
estimating aggregate consumption (Darby and Ireland (1994) and by the ESRC 
Macromodelling Bureau to re-estiMate the Weale (1990) model). The method can provide 
consistent and efficient estimates when the function is non-linear, regressors are correlated 
with the error ten-n and when disturbances are autocorrelated and/or heteroskedastic. 
Following Levine (1994) a steady state equilibrium model is constructed for a 
closed economy vAth consumption, production and government sectors. Using mostly 
estimated or observed parameters, we compute an order-of-magnitude-feel for the effects 
on long-run growth of the debt/GDP ratio, the tax rate and the proportion of development 
expenditure in total government spending. 
Chapter I proVides an outline of the issues concerning fiscal policy and econorruc 
growth in India. We discuss the strategy of development, the financing of plans and the 
pattern of public spending and taxation that led to the growth of public debt in India. This is 
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fol-lowed by a brief discussion on recent changes in the economy under the Structural 
Adjustment Programme including changes in fiscal policy like tax rates and the proportion 
of development expenditure m total government spending. 
Chapters 2-4 relate to the consumption side of the model. We derive the 
consumption function first under Ricardian assumptions and later model deviations from 
these assumptions. Chapter 2 describes the behaviour of a representative agent who 
maximizes utility subject to his fife-time wealth. Horizons are assumed to be inýinite and 
taxes are lump sum. The government's budget constraint and solvency condition are 
defined. The household and government sector's intertemporal budget constraints are 
combined to provide a simple exposition of the Ricardian Equivalence theorem. Methods of 
testing this proposition are discussed and the model is estimated for India. 
The consumption function of the representative agent in chapter 2 is derived under 
the assumptions of an absence of liquidity constraints, population growti-i, distortionary 
taxes and finite horizons. In chapter 3, these assumptions are dropped. We define 
consumption behaviour of individuals and then aggregate over the population. The 
population is defined to consist of liquidity constrained and unconstrained groups of 
consumers with the possibifity of migration from one group to another. This permits us to 
include individuals with different consumption behaviour in one population. In chapter 4 we 
17 -- nrst define the aggregate consumption function in terms of observable variables by 
excluding human and non-human wealth. Aggregate consumption is now defined in terrns 
of current and lagged values of income and consumption. Next we discuss the 
methodology of estimation and describe the Generalized Method of Moments. The model 
is estimated for India and results are analysed. We then proVide supporting eVidence for our 
results relating to income distribution. 
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Chapter 5 first presents the production function that underl-ines our growth model. 
Output exhibits constant returns to a broad concept of capital that includes both private 
capital and public infi7astructure. Combining this with the household and government 
sectors described earlier, we denve a model of endogenous growth in a closed economy. 
Conditions for steady state growth are defined and the model is calibrated for India. We 
derive tax, debt and development expenditure multipliers to examine the impact of fiscal 
policy variables on long-run growth. We then discuss the implications of our results and the 
impact of non-Ricardian assumptions on the multipliers. This is followed by our conclusions 
and a discussion on the direction of future research. 
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Chapter I 
Public Spending and Debt in India 
In ntid- 1991 a severe balance of payment crisis forced India to borrow from the 
IMF. The loan for a Structural Adjustment Programme came with the conditionality 
that the fiscal deficit be reduced. The underlying theoretical basis of this policy is the 
view that an increase in public borrowing increases aggregate demand. Tf-ýs has a spill- 
over effect and so to reduce a balance of trade deficit, fiscal deficit must be reduced. 
The attempt to reduce the fiscal deficit in India has resulted in a reduction primarily in 
government spending earmarked for public investment. 
In this chapter we present a brief discussion of the econorruc changes in India 
since the beginning of the planning process. We also examine the most recent changes 
including the opening up of the economy and the reduced role of the public sector. We 
focus upon the reasons for the growth of public debt and measures taken to reduce it 
under the Structural Adjustment Programme under way. We briefly discuss the causes 
for the growth of government expenditure and public debt, and for the balance of 
payment crisis that forced India to borrow from the IMF and to finally tackle the issue 
of the high fiscal deficit as part of the loan conditionality. 
The arrangements with the RVIF and World Bank came with the conditionalities - 
tc correction of macro-economic imbalances, an internationally competitive economy, a 
rapid increase in our exports, and improved efficiency of the public sector" ( SIngh 
(1992)). The government committed itself to reduce the Union Government deficit to 
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6.5 per cent in 1991-92 and 5 percent in 1992-3. Half of the adjustment was to be 
achieved by higher taxes and the other half by lowering public expenditure. I 
The attempt to reduce fiscal deficit led to a cut in public investment and 
development outlays, while current expenditure continued to rise. To examine the 
reasons for the growth of public debt we shall look at the pattern of public expenditure 
and taxation, budget deficits and the consequent growth of public debt. The discussion 
shall begin with a brief outline of India's development strategy which provided the 
rationale for public investment and expenditure. 
I. I. Development Strategy 
The major objectives of economic development in India were growth, self 
reliance and social justice. As there was little to redistribute but poverty, growth 
gained overriding importance. Industry was to be the engine of growth and 
development of the Indian economy. The major obstacle in the path of industrial 
expansion was seen to be the lack of adequate productive capacity. The strategy of 
industrialisation chosen emphasised an increase in capital stock through a high rate of 
investment. Following a severe balance of payment crisis in 1957-58 foreign exchange 
was also viewed as a major constraint. The economy was to be a mixed economy and 
the path of development a planned one. The Indian planning model was inspired by the 
planning model of the USSR. As the onus of promoting growth lay on the public 
sector, a large part of the financial bUFden of economic development rested on the 
shoulders of the govertunent. 
I irculated in The memorandum as sent to the IMF by the finance minister, Dr. Manmohan SlngJiý on August 27,199 1, and ci 
Parliament on December 16,1991. 
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Indian planners were pessimistic about the growth of Indian exports and they 
tried to overcome the foreign exchange constraint by reducing imports. This implied 
import substitution in as many products as possible. It also meant expanding the 
capacity to produce a large number of consumer goods. As the economy was viewed 
as virtually closed, capital goods had to be produced domestically and the rate of 
growth of productive capacity was to be maximised by producing 'machine making 
machines'. Production of 'machine making machines' meant investment in large scale 
capital intensive industry involving large initial capital outlays, long gestation lags and 
high risks. As private investors were unlikely to undertake such investment, it fell upon 
the public sector to promote the capital and basic goods industry sector. Table 1.1 
shows the Gross Fixed Capital Formation in the private and public sectors as a 
proportion of GDP. The relative size of the public sector remains quite high from the 
second plan period right upto 1990. This can be clearly seen in Figure. 1.1. 
Industrial output saw a significant deceleration in growth in the period 1966-67 
to 1981-82. There is considerable debate about the cause of this slowdown in growth 
rate from 6.9 per cent in the preceding decade to 5.0 during this period. Some 
economists attribute it to the significant reduction in public investment that took place 
at this time (Bardhan (1984)). Fixed capital formation in the public sector at 1970-71 
prices grew at an annual rate of 11.3 per cent in the period 1950-51 to 1965-66, and 
declined to a rate of less than half, that is 5.5 per cent, in the period 1966-67 to 198 1- 
82. Since public investment accounts for nearly half the total gross fixed capital 
formation in the economy and about five times the amount in the private corporate 
sector, this cut back had a considerable effect on growth. 
Table 1-1: Gross Fixed Capital Formation in the Public and Private Sectors as a 
per cent of GDP 
Year Public Sector Private Sector 
1950-55 2.84 6.1 
1955-60 5.26 7.54 
1960-65 6.96 7.32 
1965-70 6.34 8.72 
1970-75 6.2 7.92 
1975-80 8.02 9.88 
1980-85 9.62 9.98 
1985-90 10.4 11.6 
1990-91 9.4 13.8 
1991-92 9.5 12.7 
1992-93 8.5 13.0 
1993-94 8.4 12.5 
Source- Economic Survey 1994-95 (1995), Government of India, New Delhi. 
An important factor was also that the cut backs from the mid-sixties onwards 
were on sectors like railways and electricity that were crucial for growth in the private 
sector. The deceleration was seen mainly in the basic and capital goods industry where 
growth rates more than halved. These included mainly heavy industries such as basic 
metals, metal products, electrical and non-electrical machinery, and transport 
equipment. The reduction in public investment meant a decline not only in the 
infrastructure facilities like power, fuel and transport, much of which is in the public 
sector, but also in the demand for the products of capital goods industries that public 
investment generates. 
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Agriculture was the dominant sector in the Indian economy. It accounted for 
more than 50 per cent of the share of output and 70 per cent of the labour force 
employed. Growth in agriculture was initially expected to take place through an 
increase in irrigation and an improvement in land distribution. Food output, however, 
barely kept up with the rate of growth of population. Availability of food fluctuated 
greatly with rainfall. The drought in 1965 created shortages and forced India to import 
large quantities of wheat from the US under PL 480. The desire to reduce external 
dependence for food was crucial in bringing about the Green Revolution. Changes in 
the technology of wheat production were ushered in into certain pockets of the 
country which were well irrigated and where the institutional structure was conducive 
to the adoption of new technology. The technology was promoted by providing a 
number of subsidies on power, imported inputs, credit and machinery. 
Ii 
Due to the externalities and indivisibilities involved in investment in 
infrastructure facilities in agriculture, public investment was crucial. Growth prospects 
of Indian agriculture are vitally dependent on public investment in irrigation, drainage 
and flood control, in land shaping and land consolidation, in prevention of soil erosion 
and salinity, in the development of a widespread research and extension network, and 
in rural electrification and provision of productive credit. The expansion of irrigation 
and state and community projects for tapping groundwater through public tube-wells, 
for flood control and for soil improvements can have dramatic results. Since the 
average size of land holdings even among the better-off farmers is small in many parts 
of the country, the capacity of the farmer to invest is limited. There is thus a need for 
supplementary public investment . 
1.2. Financing Development 
Public expenditure in India consists of plan expenditure and non-plan 
expenditure. Plan expenditure is the outlay on Five Year Plans. These include outlays 
on industry, agriculture, energy, health, education, social services, etc. The main 
source of financing plan expenditure was borrowing. The returns from the investments 
made were expected to be adequate to pay off the debt. Non-plan expenditure was 
mainly current expenditure and was to be financed by revenue. The main sources of 
budgetary revenue were expected to be direct and indirect taxes and profits of public 
sector enterprises. However, most public sector enterprises, except oil companies, 
were running losses and had to be heavily subsidised. 
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1.3. Growth of Public Expenditure 
Plan expenditure covered government spending on infrastructure, power, capital 
and basic goods industries like iron and steel plants, education, health, etc. These were 
essential for the long term economic and industrial development of the country but 
were largely unprofitable investments. Returns were low and due after a long time. 
Non-plan or current expenditure consisted mainly of government spending on 
public administration, defence and subsidies. India had inherited the colonial 
administrative structure with its high costs and low efficiency. The public sector 
employed more than half the labour force employed in the organised sector. 
Government consumption expenditure has two components- compensation to 
employees and purchase of consumer goods and services. More employees imply more 
office equipment, transport, etc. Given the employment, other complementary 
expenditure becomes partially committed. Compensation to employees consists of 
wages and salaries that are the main component, and pensions and other benefits to 
employees. 
Public spending on education consists of spending in primary, secondary, 
vocational and higher education including universities, medical, engineering and 
management schools, research and development, etc. Education is highly subsidised 
especially at the higher level. Government expenditure on health and education 
consists mainly on employment of persons. About 92 per cent of the expenditure on 
education by the government and 72 per cent of the expenditure on health is on salaries 
and wages (Bhattacharya (1992) p. 119). 
Total employment in the public sector was rapidly growing at a rate faster than 
the rate of growth of the population till 1984, after which some effort was made to 
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slow it down. Real wages in the public sector grew faster than per capita real national 
income in the 'eighties. Average emoluments in public enterprises in 1988-89 were 9.5 
times per capita real national income against 8.7 times in 1980-8 1. (Bhattacharya 
(1992) p. 121-125). 
Defence spending was high and rising because of external political uncertainties. 
The defence budget accounts for about 4 per cent of GDP and 16 per cent of total 
government expenditure. Taking related expenditure into account it is probably higher 
at 5 per cent of GDP and 20 per cent of total government expenditure though it is still 
relatively low in international comparison (Bhattacharya (1992)). 
Subsidies on food, fertilisers and exports were rising. The share of government 
expenditure on agriculture rose after the green revolution as the state provided 
incentives to farmers in the form of subsidies on seeds, fertilisers, credit, etc. Real 
investment, both public and private in agriculture slowed down in the 'eighties. The 
sharp rise in subsidies , 
both open and implicit, eroded the surplus available for public 
investment in agriculture to a considerable extent. (RBI (I 994), p. 109) 
It is estimated that in the early seventies aggregate government expenditure was 
declining in real terms. In the late seventies nominal expenditure growth rose to over 
13 per cent per annum and real expenditure started growing quite rapidly. After 1979 
norn-inal expenditure growth rose to 18.6 per cent but due to the higher inflation rate 
real growth in expenditure remained stable. Real growth rose sharply in the period 
after 1983 ( Mundle and Rao (1992), p. 230-3 1). 
Another trend in the pattern of public expenditure is the declining share of capital 
expenditure in total public expenditure. The economic classification of expenditure 
reveals that from 1971-72 to 1987-88 the share of capital expenditure shrunk from 
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over 56 per cent of total central government expenditure to only 30 per cent. This was 
mainly because of the dramatic increases in the share of interest payments, subsidies 
and compensation to government employees (Mundle and Rao (1992) Table 3, p. 233) 
1.4. Tax Revenue 
The was a considerable growth in tax revenues over this period even though it 
did not increase at the same rate as public expenditure. The tax to GDP ratio rose from 
6 per cent in 1950-51 to about II per cent by 1970-71 and further to about 17 percent 
in the eighties. 
The increase in tax revenue was accompanied by a significant increase in the 
share of indirect taxes. This was due to a fall in the contribution of direct taxes. They 
fell from about 30 per cent of tax revenue in the early sixties to 14 per cent in 1989-90 
(Mundle and Rao (1992) p. 236). In the 1980's there has been a slight increase in the 
share of direct taxes as seen in Table 1.2. 
Table 1.2: Direct and Indirect Tax revenues of the Centre and States combined 
(as a per cent of GDP) 
Year Direct Indirect Total 
1980-81 2.6 11.9 14.5 
1985-86 2.7 13.7 16.4 
1990-91 2.7 13.8 16.5 
1991-92 3.1 13.6 16.7 
1992-93 3.2 13.0 16.2 
1993-94(RE) 3.2 12.0 15ý2 
Source- Reserve Bank of India Annual Report 1993-94, (1994), Bombay, Table 111.9 , 
p. 196. 
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The tax base for both direct and indirect taxes is narrow. In the case of indirect 
taxes most services are completely excluded from the tax base and many goods, 
especially those produced in the informal sector escape taxation. The base for personal 
income tax has been rendered extremely narrow by excluding agricultural income, 
administrative difficulties of taxing the unorganised non-agricultural sector and the 
provision for exemptions and deductions for various purposes. The base for corporate 
taxes has been eroded by making generous deductions for depreciation and 
reinvestment and contributions for a wide variety of social purposes. Though 
agriculture constitutes the largest sector in terms of output and employment, yet, 
problems of estimation and costs of collection prevent agricultural incomes from being 
taxed. This has created horizontal inequity in the system. It has prevented the taxation 
of large land owners and rich farmers. It has also provided a means of tax evasion for 
those who have income from both agricultural and non-agncultural sources. For the 
tax payers this led to margi I nal income tax rates that were very high (up to 97 per cent). 
This encouraged tax evasion. At the same time legal and tax administration machinery 
was loose and tax evaders were not penalised. While the actual magnitude of income 
tax evasion is difficult to estimate and different studies suggest different figures, it can 
easily be said that it was large enough to considerably affect tax revenues. 
Apart from the inadequate growth in tax revenues, the income from non-tax 
revenues has also contributed to the growth in revenues lagging behind. Implicit 
subsidies by way of unrecovered costs are provided on a whole range of social and 
econormc services provided by the government. 
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1.5. Composition of Public Debt 
The 1980s saw a rapid rise in public expenditure in India. The current 
expenditure of the government as a ratio of GDP rose from 11.5 per cent in 1970-71 
to almost 23.1 per cent in 1989-90. As mentioned above, wHe expenditure was rising, 
receipts were not rising at the same rate since taxes, especially direct taxes, were not 
buoyant. Over the 1980s, the gap between expenditure and receipts was increasing. 
While there was a budgetary surplus in the 1970s, the 1980s saw a rise in budget 
deficits. During the eighties the deficit on the budget was slowly rising and by 1989-90 
the fiscal deficit rose to 12.8 per cent of the GDP. About 72 per cent of the gap was 
financed by domestic borrowing, 7 per cent from external assistance and 21 per cent 
from deficit financing (Economic Survey, 1990-9 1). 
Till the rrud-1980's, the government bond market was more or less a captive 
market as government securities were bought by financial institutions like banks and 
insurance companies to fulfil their Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) requirements, 
which had risen to 38.5 per cent, even though rates of interest on government bonds 
were very low and even negative in real terms. If public debt was larger than the 
amount the financial institutions had to hold, then the surplus would be monetised as 
the Reserve Bank of India was obliged to lend to the government. In the 1980s special 
government bonds were issued under various schemes like the Indira V1kas Patras and 
Kisan Vikas Patras at non-iinal rates of interest of up to 9 to 10 percent. In addition, tax 
concessions were given to those who purchased these bonds. The high interest rates of 
government conu-nercial borrowing from households as well as the tax concessions 
proved to be a burden on the exchequer. 
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This led to a substantial increase in interest payments made on public debt. The 
rising interest payments since the 1980's are a consequence of three factors -the 
increase in total debt, the increase in the interest rate and the increase in the 
proportion of high interest bearing liabilities in the government's debt. The internal 
liabilities of the Government of India have been classified into two categories, the 
"internal debt " and the "other liabilities". The internal debt consists of (i)market loans, 
(ii) Treasury Bills, (111) Special Securities issued to the RBI, (iv) Special Bearer Bonds, 
and (v) Balances of expired loans, Prize Bonds, Premium Prize Bonds, etc.. "Other 
liabilities" comprise (i) small savings, (ii) state provident funds, (111) Public provident 
fund etc. These so-called "other liabilities" carry a higher rate of interest than internal 
debt and there has been a rise in the proportion of "other liabilities" in the government's 
total liabilities. The consequence of higher interest payments is a significant rise in the 
magnitude of public debt. Table 1.3 shows the sharp increase in the debt/GDP ratio 
since 1980-81. 
Table 1.3: Total Outstanding Liabilities of the Government of India (as a per 
cent of GDP) 
Year Total Liabilities 
1980-81 43.9 
1984-85 49.0 
1985-86 52.4 
1990-91 59.1 
1991-92 57.8 
1992-93 57.0 
1993-94(RE) 58.7 
Source- Reserve Bank of India, Annual Report 1993-94, (1994), Bombay, Table 111.4 , 
19 1. 
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This led to widespread concern at the rising public debt and a number of studies 
like Seshan (1987), Rangarajan el aL (1989), Buiter and Patel (1990) and Chelliah 
(1992) concluded that the path was unsustainable. However, no serious attempt was 
made to curtail government borrowing. This was despite an official declaration of 
intent to arrest further deterioration of budget deficits made in the Long Term Fiscal 
Policy (LTFP) statement of 1985 which suggested certain specific measures to reverse 
the decline in public savings -a reduction in subsidies and unproductive adnunistrative 
expenditure and increasing the contribution of public enterprises through proper 
pricing and other policies. The Centre's borrowing remained at 7 per cent of GDP 
against the target of 4 per cent set by the LTFP and public saving did not go beyond 
2.4 per cent despite the target of 4 per cent. The seventh five year plan finalised in 
1985 provided for a rate of growth of non-plan expenditure no higher than the rate of 
growth of GDP in an attempt to contain public borrowing. But the growth of non-plan 
expenditure was three times as high during the seventh plan period (Jalan (1992)). 
1.6. The External Crisis 
At the same time , 
during the 1980s, a balance of payment crisis was developing. 
1979 saw the second oil price shock and a rise in US interest rates and LIBOR raising 
the burden of servicing the existing external debt. Due to the recession in industrial 
countries and the uncompetitiveness of the exchange rate, export growth was slow. 
Some attempts at liberalisation saw growth in new industries like automobiles 
and electronics, both heavily dependent on imports of technology and components. As 
the economy grew at relatively much higher rates of growth of 5.5 per cent over the 
21 
decade, imports grew rapidly. The widening current account deficit was Increasingly 
financed by non-concessional loans. According to World Bank debt data, India's total 
outstanding foreign debt increased from $18.7 billion in 1980 to $56.3 billion in 1989 
and debt to private creditors increased from about $2 to $21.4 billion during this 
period ( Jalan(1992)). The Gulf crisis resulted in a higher import bill and a loss in 
foreign remittances. The collapse of the USSR and Eastern Europe led to a decline in 
Indian exports. 
The above trends led to a balance of payment crisis in June 1991. India was left 
with only two weeks imports worth of foreign exchange. Her credit rating fell sharply 
and foreign private lending was cut off For the first time there was a serious possibility 
of default. Faced with this crisis the government was forced to act. 
1.7. Stabilisation and Structural Adjustment 
Emergency stabilisation measures aimed at reducing inflation, which had risen to 
12 per cent, and the current account deficit, that stood at 3 per cent of GDP and 40 
per cent of exports, were taken. Emergency import controls, that were later eased, 
were imposed. Gold backed external borrowing was undertaken. The rupee was 
devalued by 22 per cent. A scheme of tradable import entitlements for exporters was 
introduced. A tight monetary policy implied reducing money supply and raising rates of 
interest. The July 1991 budget set a target for reducing the central government's fiscal 
deficit from 9 per cent to 6.5 per cent of GDP. 
The immediate aims of the measures were to bring the current account deficit to 
2.7 per cent of the GDP and inflation down to 9 per cent. Loans were negotiated with 
the IMF and the World Bank for stabilisation and structural adjustment. The reforms, 
1) 1) 
as outlined in the letters of intent from the finance minister to the IW and the World 
Bank, were designed to remove impediments to domestic and foreign private 
investment and to deregulate industry. The import regime was drastically simplified , 
tariffs were reduced, export subsidies simplified and the rupee made convertible thus 
letting market forces determine the exchange rate. This trade and exchange rate 
liberalisation was also accomparned by tax reform, reform of public sector enterprises 
and the financial sector which had direct implications for the fiscal deficit. The tax 
reform consists of a cut in import duties, a streamlining of personal taxes- a cut in tax 
rates and a reduction in exemptions, restructuring of capital gains and wealth taxes. 
New measures include an increase in the corporate tax rate, a reduction in generous 
depreciation allowances that had tended to encourage capital- intensive methods of 
production, a tax on the gross interest receipt of banks, increases in excise duties, and 
a reduction in the rates of import duties. 2 
The reform of the financial sector consists primarily of a reduction in the 
Statutory Liquidity Ratio and a rationalisation of subsidised credit to priority sectors, 
relaxation of interest controls and restrictions on firms' access to capital markets, and 
more autonomy to public sector banks. The major reform in the case of public sector 
enterprises consisted of eliminating privileges such as protection from external and 
domestic competition and preferential access to budget and bank resources. Though 
the condition relating to an effective 'exit policy' for closure or restructuring of money 
loosing firms in the private and public sector has not been fulfilled, the reforms made 
have largely been in line with the programme's objectives. 
2- Memorandum of Economic Policies for 1991-92 and 1992-93', in U. Kapila, (ed), 'Recent Developments in the Indian Economy' 
Part-1, p. 322 
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The most important change appears to be in the opening up of the economy to 
foreign capital and the removal of exchange restrictions on imports. Consequently, in 
1994 India attained Article VIII status and joined the ranks of the 96 other such 
member countries of the M. International monetary arrangements after the Bretton 
Woods Conference required members of the EMF to restore current account 
convertibility. The obligation as defined in Article VIII , 
Sections 2,3 and 4 stipulates 
that member countries should have no restrictions on current payments and avoid 
discriminatory currency practices. The first major step towards current account 
convertibility was taken with the unification of the exchange rate and the removal of 
exchange restrictions on imports through the abolition of foreign exchange budgeting 
at the beginning of 1993-94. Relaxation in payment restriction in the case of a number 
of invisible transactions followed the budget for 1994-95. In August 1994, the final 
step towards current account convertibility was taken by further liberalisation of 
invisibles payments and acceptance of the obligations VIII of the RVIU, under which 
India is conunitted to forsake the use of exchange restrictions in current international 
transactions as an instrument in managing the balance of payments. 
In 1993-94 imports stood at 10.5 percent of GDP. External debt had been 
reduced from 41 percent in 1991-92 to 40 per cent in 1992-93 and further to 36 per 
cent in 1993-94. Direct foreign investment quadrupled from $150 million in 1991-92 to 
$620 million in 1993-94. In the first half of 1994-95, it was 50 per cent higher than in 
the first half of 1993-94 (Economic Survey 1994-95, p. 9). The current account deficit 
was brought down to nearly 0.1 per cent of GDP in 1994-95. While the reforms appear 
to be successful in the context of the external sector, their success as far as the 
government expenditure and deficit is concerned appears to be limited. 
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1.8. Cut in Development Expenditure 
The rates targeted for the reduction in fiscal deficit have not been achieved. For 
example, though the gross fiscal deficit (GFD) was brought down from 8.39 per cent 
of GDP in 1990-91 to below 6 per cent in the next two years, there was a deterioration 
in the following years. The GFD to GDP ratio increased to 7.3 per cent in 1993-94 
(Revised Estimates) as against budget estimates of 4.7 per cent. As data from the RBI 
Annual Report 1993-94 indicates there was an increase in the revenue account gap 
from the budget estimates of 2.3 per cent of GDP to 4.2 per cent of GDP. This may be 
explained by both the shortfall in revenue proceeds and the overruns in expenditure. 
The shortfall in revenue receipts in 1993-94 accounted for 37.2 per cent of the total 
increase in GFD during 1993-94. This was due to the decline in customs and excise 
duties due to sluggish industrial activity and the reduction in custom duty rates. Total 
revenue collection was 9.6 per cent lower than estimated in the budget. In the 
following years, including in the 1995-96 budget, there has been a further reduction in 
custom duties which would reduce revenue collection from this source. Expenditures 
also grew by 9.6 per cent over the budget estimates; subsidies were 48.0 per cent 
higher while defence was 12.1 per cent higher. Both food and fertillser subsidies 
increased. Since 1992 the government has taken some steps in an attempt to cut the 
growth of consumption expenditure. These include a reduction of posts at various 
levels, overall cut in consumption of petrol, diesel, reduction in expenditure on 
telephones and restriction on purchases of additional vehicles. The strength of the staff 
of the Central Government showed an estimated decline of about fifty thousand from 
March 1992 to March 1994 (Economic Survey 1994-95, p. 16). However, 
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consumption expenditure still grew from 3.8 per cent of GDP to 4.1 per cent of GDP 
from 1992-93 to 1993-94 and led to a rise in revenue deficit. 
Another major area of concern is the growing interest burden that accounted for 
43.8 per cent of total non-plan expenditure and 53.4 per cent of revenue receipts in the 
1994-95 budget. As discussed earlier this is the consequence of the high fiscal deficits 
in the eighties that have resulted in the accumulation of a large public debt and of the 
application of market related interest rates in the sale of government securities that has 
led to an increase in the service cost on internal debt. 
Table 1.4: Measures of Dericit of the Central Government (as a per cent of GDP 
at current market prices) 
Year Gross Fiscal Net Primary Revenue 
Deficit Deficit Deficit 
1980-85 6.26 2.99 1.11 
1985-90 8.21 3.80 2.58 
1990-91 8.39 3.32 3.49 
1991-92 5.90 1.46 2.64 
1992-93 5.69 1.66 2.63 
1993-94 4.71 0.44 2.25 
(Budget Estimate) 
1993-94 7.29 2.72 4.24 
(Revised Estimate) 
Source: Reserve Bank of India, Annual Report 1993-94, (1994), Bombay, Table 3.1 , 
3 5. 
In recent years there has been an increase in net primary deficit (defined as GFD 
less net lending less net interest payments). As Table 1.4 shows it has increased from 
1.7 per cent of GDP in 1992-93 to 2.7 per cent of GDP in 1993-94 despite the target 
'-) 
of 0.44 per cent. This is likely to lead to a further rise in the debt to GDP ratio and 
interest burden in the future. Total debt servicing consisting of interest payments and 
repayment of debt was 112.8 per cent of total revenue receipts in 1993-94 (Economic 
Survey 1994-95). Table 1.4 also shows that instead of falling from 5.7 per cent to 4.7 
per cent from 1992-93 to 1993-94 as was the budget estimate, the Gross Fiscal Deficit 
rose to 7.3 per cent. 
The sharp deterioration in the revenue deficit has changed the composition of the 
G. FD such that it explained 58 per cent of GFD in 1993-94 as against 46 per cent in 
1992-93 and 17.0 per cent in the first half of the eighties. In other words, 58 per cent 
of government borrowing in 1993-94 was to cover current expenditure. There was a 
squeeze in capital outlay from 2.3 percent of GDP in 1990-91 to 1.6 per cent In 1993- 
94 ( RBI (1994), p. 36-37) 
The State Government budgets also show a similar trend "large budgetary gaps 
particularly on revenue account, rising non-developmental expenditure, reduction in 
the availability of resources fo r investment and a sluggish revenue 
performance. "(RBI, (I 994) p. 42) The overall deficit nearly doubled from 1993-94 to 
1994-95 while revenue deficit went up by one-third. The GFD is thus expected to be 
28 per cent higher. As compared with an average surplus of 16.8 per cent of GFD in 
early eighties, the revenue deficit was 28 per cent of GFD- Consequently, as compared 
to only 7.7 per cent of overall borrowing being utilised to finance current expenditure 
in the latter half of the 'eighties, 28.1 per cent of the overall borrowing was siphoned 
off to finance current expenditure. The availability of funds for capital outlay and net 
lending that reflects the states' investment operations gets correspondingly reduced. 
While the central government had greater flexibility in its budget as it could borrow 
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from the public, the access of state governments to public borrowing was much more 
limited. Consequently, state government's showed substantial shortfalls in actual 
outlays in relation to plan projections. Since the primary responsibility for investment 
in social sectors, agriculture and irrigation is that of the states, there was a dech in ne 
these areas (Jalan, 1992). 
The composition of expenditure shows that non -development expenditure (i. e. 
interest payments, administrative services, pensions and miscellaneous general 
services) rose faster than the development component from an average of 22.9 per cent 
in the late eighties to 3 1.1 per cent in 1994-95. 
The increased reliance on borrowing both from the Centre and the market 
implies higher repayments and interest payments in the future which would further 
curtail development expenditure. For the Centre and State budgets combined the rising 
committed outlays for interest payments and administrative expenses have increased 
from 9.9 per cent of GDP in 1985-86 to 11.6 per cent in 1993-94. The combined 
government sector capital outlay has declined from 5.0 per cent to 3.2 per cent of GDP 
over this period. The share of non-development expenditure has increased from 32.4 
per cent to 42.4 per cent of total expenditure over this period and is expected to rise 
further. 
The overall picture that emerges from the above account of government 
spending and expenditure is a fall in the proportion of capital outlays and development 
expenditure in total government expenditure. Table 1.5 shows that the proportion of 
development expenditure has declined by more than 10 per cent since 1980. 
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Table 1.5: Development expenditure of Centre and States (as a per cent of total 
expenditure) 
Year Development Expenditure 
1980-81 66.0 
1984-85 64.6 
1985-86 65.1 
1990-91 58.8 
1991-92 55.5 
1992-93 55.7 
1993-94 (R. E) 54.3 
Source-. Reserve Bank of India Annual Report 1993-94, (1994), Bombay, 
Table 111.10 
, p. 
197. 
To analyse the effect of the ongoing changes in government expenditure and debt 
in India we shall first test the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis. We then present a 
general model encompassing both the Ricardian and the non- Ricardian models. This 
model is estimated for India to determine the underlying behavioural parameters that 
are crucial in determining the impact of debt on growth. Finally, we present a model of 
endogenous growth driven by capital externalities arising from both private capital and 
public capital and infrastructure. Since the fiscal deficit is equal to the revenue and 
capital expenditures and net domestic lending minus revenue receipts and grants 
measuring the overall resource gap, it is possible to reduce it by a cut in capital 
expenditures rather than government consumption expenditure. Therefore, we examine 
the effect of not just government borrowing, change in tax rate and the change in the 
ratio of public investment to total government on long-run growth rate of the GDP. 
We limit the scope of this study to the effects, rather than the causes for the 
growth in non-development versus development expenditure. The political economy of 
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the forces that generate the pressures on current expenditures of the government at the 
expense of public investment in India is another study in itself (for example, Bardhan 
(1989)). 
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Chapter 2 
Debt Neutrality 
Theory and Evidence 
Standard econonk theory suggests that an expansionary fiscal policy raises 
aggregate demand in an economy. It leads to a reduction in private spending, especially in 
private investment associated with an increase in real interest rates caused by fiscal 
expansion. This phenomenon is referred to as 'crowding-out'. Barro, (1974) suggested that 
the underlying premises of the crowding out hypothesis is that consumers perceive a cut in 
taxes to be a rise in permanent income. If consumers were rational and far sighted, they 
would expect a cut in current taxes to be followed by a rise in taxes at some time in the 
future. They would, therefore, not perceive the cut as a rise in permanent income and 
would not change their consumption levels. This hypothesis has come to be known as 
Ricardian EquiValence. ' 
In this chapter we shall discuss the Ricardian Equivalence theorem of debt- 
neutrahty. Section I sets out the representative agent model. Section 2 introduces the 
govenunent into the model and discusses Barro's hypothesis. Section 3 examines some of 
the evidence on Ricardian Equivalence. In section 4 we exarnine the evidence for India. 
2.1 A Representative Agent Model 
Consumption is determined by fife-tune resources rather than income in the current 
period. Life-time resources represent permanent income which can be thought of as a 
constant resource flow that can be sustained throughout the planning horizon. If current 
income exceeds permanent income, the individual saves. He can acquire physical or 
' The hypothesis is associated with Ricardo( 1951) in whose vntings this idea finds its first articulation. Even though Ricardo had 
doubts about the equivalence hypothesis, the proposition continued to be linked with his name. '17he terin Ricardian Equivalence %vas 
first introduced to macroeconomists by James Buchanan ( 19 76). 
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financial assets. Both yield the same rate of return and are assumed to be perfect substitutes 
in his portfolio basket. If current income f9s short of permanent income, the individual 
borrows. Debt is treated as a negative asset. There are no constraints or imperfections in 
the market which prevent him fi7om borrowing at the market rate of interest. 
Preferences are assumed to be intertemporafly additive. Lifetime utility is the sum 
of the sub-utilities of consumption in each period discounted at the subjective discount rate. 
This reflects the impatience because of which consumers attach a lower weight to the utility 
of future consumption. The utility function of the representative consumer at time t may be 
written as 
ut 
= (-ýZ, ), 4c 1 t+i i=O (2.1) 
where 6 is the constant rate of time preference and u() is a time invanant, concave utility 
function. As in Barro, (1974) it is assumed that agents take account of the welfare and 
resources of their prospective descendants. This inter-generational interaction is modelled 
by assurning that an agent maximises utility subject to a budget constraint over an infinite 
horizon. Thus, although an agent has a finite fife, his planning horizon is infinite to take care 
of his immortal extended family. The infinite planning horizon assumption thus corresponds 
to finite lived individuals connected via a pattern of operative inter-generational transfers. 
These transfers are assumed to be bequests that are based on altruism and assumed to be 
non-negative. 
The consumer's budget identity in period t may be written as 
(I+r) V, I+ f4 - C, (2.2) 
where 
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Vt = non-human wealth at the end of pefiod t 
r= rate of interest assumed constant 
Q= consumption in penod t 
f2t = post tax labour income in pefiod t 
Rearranging (2.2) and solving forward in time the budget identity become the solvency 
constraint 
00 
+ r)v, -, 
[ct+i 
- 
Qt+i (2.3) 
provided that the transversality condition lim Vt+i :::::: 0 i-400 
-(I 
+ r) 
does not grow at a rate faster than the rate of interest. 
holds or that wealth 
The representative agent's intertemporal budget constraint implies that the total 
value of consumption over time is equal to the total human and non-human wealth 
possessed by the consumer. Non-human wealth is represented by V, and includes the 
financial and non-financial assets owned by the consumer. Human wealth is the present 
value of a future stream of disposable income and may be represented by 
i=o + r) 
t+i 
(2.4) 
Maximising the representative individual's objective function (2.1) subject to the 
intertemporal budget constraint (2.3), we obtain the first order condition 
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++ r) 
(2.5) 
(where ý is the Lagrange multiplier) along with the intertemporal budget constraint. 
Thus, 
constant for all i 
The Euler equation is : 
u'(cý) =1+ 
öu(c+11) 
1+ r) 
(2.6) 
The two instantaneous utility functions that we encounter frequently in the 
literature are the quadratic and the constant elasticity of substitution utility functions. 
if the utility function is quadratic 
Ct) 
2 
Ct 
where C is the bliss level of effective consumption. Then we can derive the Euler 
equation, 
Ct -a+, 8Ct-, 
where, a 
9) 
+ r) 
and, 8 = 
(I 
(I +0 
(2.7) 
The other form of the utility function that we shall come across in the following 
chapters is the isoelastic or the constant elasticity of substitution function . 
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U(c ct 
CY 
ln(Ct) 
if YCF > 0, YCY 
if G=1 
(2.8) 
where cy is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. It measures how responsive is 
the ratio of consumption in the two periods to relative prices. Estimates of cy vary 
substantially but usually lie around or below unIty ( Blanchard and Fischer(1987) 
p. 44). In case cy = 1, the utility function is logarithmic in form. In the case of the 
logarithmic utility function the Euler equation is linear and of the form 
C= al- t P'-t-i 
where, P 
r) 
(1+45) 
(2.9) 
2.2. The Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis 
If it is assumed that the utility function is logarithmic then by combining (2.9)VVqth 
the budget constraint (2.3) we can show that 
ct = ýt IWO Vt-l + Yý (2.10) 
where ýt = 6/1+6. and it represents the marginal propensity to consume out of lifetime 
wealth which consists of human and non-human wealth. (2.10) represents the consumption 
function of the representative agent. Since R is the discounted value of post tax labour 
income, it is not independent of taxes. 
We now introduce the government into the model. It can be shown that policies that 
have a transitory effect on income are incapable of having an effect on consumption. 
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We can then demonstrate that if it is assumed as in Barro(1974) that consumers 
understand the implications of the government budget constraint, they do not regard a 
tax cut , given government spending , as permanent. They are fully aware that a cut in 
contemporaneous taxes implies a future tax increase. Hence, under these circumstances 
a tax cut leads to no change in consumption. It leads to only a transitory change in 
income which has no effect on consumption. 
It is assumed that the government obtains no revenue from the creation of money. 
The government sector has a budget identity of the forrn 
Dt = (I + r)Dt -1+ 
Gt - Tt 
where D, is public debt at the end of period t. 
D- 
Rearranging and solving forward in time, the budget identity (2.11) becomes the solvency 
constraint 
- 
co I-G 
(2.12) +r) D, 
- 
[Tt+i 
t+i 
iýo -(I+ 
r)- 
provided that the transversality condition lim D=0 holds. According to t+1 J, + r) 
a government vAth a positive debt must eventually run primairy surpluses to be 
solvent. This is a weak solvency condition as the government can be solvent even though 
its real debt and its debt/GDP ratio grows WIthout a bound. Our definition of solvency 
merely requires that this ratio does not grow faster than the growth adjusted real interest 
rate in the long run. It does not require a stable debt/GDP ratio which is referred to as a 
strong solvency condition (Buiter and Patel(I 99 1), Krichel and Levine (1995)). 
The Ricardian equivalence theorem assumes that the representative individual is 
"forward looking" and rational in regard to the fiscal affairs of the government. He 
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understands the implications of the intertemporal government budget constraint 
specified in equation (2.12). He recognises the future tax obligations implicit in the 
issue of current period and existing government debt and its servicing. We can rewrite 
the individual's intertemporal budget constraint as 
00 co 
ct+l + r)vt-, + [Nt+i - T+i 
i=o -(I 
+ r)- j=0 + r) 
since Q, = N, - T, 
where N, = labour earnings in period t (assumed to be exogenous) and 
T, = Tax payments (net of transfers) in period t. 
We can integrate the private and public sectors by substituting the government 
constraint into the representative agent's budget constraint. The budget constraint of 
the representative individual is now 
co 
c 
i=o 
+ r) 
t+l = (I + r)[V, -, - 
D, 
-, 
] 
co I 
(N, 
+i 
G, 
+I) 
1=0 + 
(2.13) 
Thus if the agent is rational and understands the government's budget constraint and 
incorporates it into his own, his intertemporal budget constraint is represented by (2.13). 
Using (2.10) we can now show that 
00 
c -D ]+I] 
(Nt+i - Gt+j) (2.14) 
i=o 
(I + r) t 
(I + r)lvt- t-I 
The consumption function of the rational representative agent is now independent 
of the level of taxes or debt issued in period t or after. Any change in taxes leaves 
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consumption unaffected. A fise in govemment spending has a negative net wealth effect 
and reduces consumption. This is because the government would have to raise taxes at 
some time to pay for higher spending, thus reducing the lifetime wealth of the consumer. 
(2.14) therefore represents the consumption function corresponding to the Barro-Ricardian 
model. Keeping the level of government spending constant , it 
demonstrates that if the 
consumer incorporates the government's intertemporal budget constraint into his own, a 
change in the level of taxes does not affect his life-time wealth i. e. it has no net wealth 
effect. A shift fi7om current taxes to a deficit has no impact on aggregate demand. 
2.3. Empirical Studies 
The most common approach to empiricaHy test the Ricardian theorem was to 
include fiscal variables in a regression of private consumption in order to test whether a 
debt financed tax cut led to an increase in private consumption expenditure 
(Feldstein(1982), Kon-nendi(1983)). Pfivate consumption was specified as a ffinction of 
income, taxes., government expenditure and private wealth including public debt and the 
proposition was tested in terms of the restrictions placed on these. The model was 
estimated usuatly for the US. Differences in measurement and restrictions led to different 
conclusions. This approach was criticised on the grounds of the arbitrariness with which 
variables were included or excluded from the model. Tl-ýs resulted from not specifying the 
underlying theoretical model. The approach did not explicitly test the assumptions of the 
equivalence proposition and expectations behaviour was not incorporated into the 
estimating model. FoHowing Aschauer (1985) we defive a model based explicitly on 
Ricardian assumptions and a government expenditure expectation function based on 
rational expectations. 
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We assume that utility is a function of the total consumption by an individual of 
both public and private goods. 
C* =C +OG tt (2.15) 
where C* denotes the level of "effective" consumption in period t. It Is a linear t 
combination of private consumption Ct . and government goods and services G,. In 
terms of effective consumption, the budget constraint of the representative individual 
is: 
00 00 
ct+1 :: -- (1+ r)[V, -, - 
Dt-, ]+1 (Nt, + (0 - 1) G, + r)- i=o -(I 
+ r)- 
Thus the present discounted value of effective consumption is constrained by 
the economy wide wealth plus the present discounted value of labour earrungs plus 
(0- 1) times the value of government expenditure. Rearranging 
(I + r)D, (I + r)V, 
Go 
-N -(O-I)G, +i]=0(2.16) t+i t+i 
i=O 1+ r) 
Maximising effective consumption (2.15) subject to the budget constraint (2.16) and if 
the utility function is assumed to be quadratic then 
ct 
= cc + 
where, a 
(r - and 
(2.17) 
+ r) + r) 
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where C is the bliss level of effective consumption. If E, is the expectations operator 
conditional on information available up to period t then the expected consumption in 
period t may be defined as 
E C*=oc+ PC* +pt tt t-I 
where p, is the error term. 
Lagging equation (2.15) by one period and substituting into equation (2.18) gives 
EtC*t = u. + P[Ct-I + OGt-l ]+ pt - Ct + OGt + Ct 
(2.19) 
where EC*=c* ttt 
If G, = E, -, 
G, + X, (2.20) 
where Xt is the error term. 
We obtain 
cc + PC, -, 
+ POG, _1 -- 
Ct+ OEt-I Gt +ýt 
Or, Ct =a+ PCt_l + POGt-l - 0E, _1 
Gt + ýt 
(2.21) 
where the error term ýt includes the effect of measurement errors, revisions in 
expectations and shocks. 
The value of government spending is predicted on the basis of past values of 
govemment spending and deficits. It is assumed that E, _1 
G, the expected value of G, at 
time t- I is given by 
Et- I Gt =y+ 6(L)Gt- I+ co 
(L)FDt- 
I+ vt 
(2.22) 
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where L is the lag operator and FDt is the government deficit in period t. The error 
term vt is such that it satisfies the orthogonality condition E(vtj 1, -, )=0,1, being the 
information set available to the agent at time t so that vt is serially uncorrelated. If 
expectations depend only on last period's spending and deficits he obtains the 
following the two equation system 
Gt =y+F, Gt-I +w FDt-j + vt (2.23) 
and 
Ct = cc' + PCt-I + fl G, + ODt-I + 7r, 
where cc' = cc - Oy 
Tj = O(p - F- 
) (2.24) 
ýt -- (1) 
Ricardian Equivalence requires that the cross equation restrictions are not 
violated because they imply that the consumer takes the government's tax and 
expenditure decisions into account. As expectations are assumed to be rational the 
government's behaviour which satisfies the intertemporal budget constraint is correctly 
predicted by individual consumers. 
Aschauer(1985) found evidence in support of Ricardian Equivalence. He 
reports that the estimated coefficient on the lagged value of consumption is highly 
significant and equal to unity implying that holding fixed the level of government 
spending - private consumption expenditure follows a random walk. The point estimate 
for substitutability of public spending for private consumption is positive and is 
significantly different from zero at the five percent level. 
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Further, likelihood ratio statistics suggest that the data does not reject the 
hypothesis at conventional significance levels. First government spending and 
consumption functions are estimated subject to the restrictions on consumption. Next 
the system is estimated without imposing the restrictions. To test the hypothesis of 
Ricardian equivalence he examines the validity of the restrictions. This is done by 
calculating the log-likelihood ratio test statistic. If Ll is the value of the likelihood 
function for the maximum of the unconstrained model and LO is the value when the 
constraints are imposed then the likelihood ratio test statistic is computed as LR 
2(LI-LO). This statistic has a X2 distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the 
2 
number of restrictions. If the estimated value of LR is less than the value of the x 
distribution at a given level of significance then it indicates that there is no significant 
discrepancy between the constrained and the unconstrained values of the log-likelihood 
function and thus we the null hypothesis that the constrained model is- true cannot be 
rej ected. 
Gupta (1992a) estimates the model for some developing countries. IFEs results 
are mixed. IFEs evidence suggests that the coefficient of lagged consumption is 
statistically significant and positive in all cases and is not significantly different from 
unity in most cases. In India it is 0.65 and is significantly different from unity. 0 the 
coefficient of government expenditure in India is negative and is found to be 
statistically different from unity. However, the null hypothesis of Ricardian 
Equivalence cannot be rejected by the likelihood ratio test. 
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2.4. Excess Sensitivity 
The Ricardian Equivalence hypothesis assumes the existence of perfect credit 
markets. Evidence indicates a role for current income in explaining consumption over 
and above that which is due to a revision in expectation of future income as signalled 
by current income (Flavin(1981), Hayashi(1982), Jappelli and Pagano(1989)). Flavin 
(198 1) analysed the role of current income in providing new information about the fUture. 
She found that the response of consumption to current income was beyond that attributable 
to the role of current income in signal-ling changes in permanent income. The permanent 
income hypothesis suggests that individual consumption depends on the resources 
available to the consumer over his entire lifetime. However, if a consumer is 
constrained by credit market imperfections and is unable to borrow and lend the 
amount he requires to undertake his optimal consumption plan then his desired 
consumption will be constrained by his current income. 
To take account of the 'excess sensitivity' of consumption to current income, 
Hayashi (1982) explicitly included the presence of some households in the economy who 
consume only their current income. The 'excess sensitivity' of consumption expenditure 
to contemporaneous disposable income may be attributed to liquidity constraints. If 
liquidity constrained consumers are significant in proportion then aggregate consumption 
reveals excess sensitivity to current income. 
The economy is assumed to comprise of two groups of consumers - the liquidity 
constrained consumers and the unconstrained consumers. 
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Aggregate consumption is assumed to be the sum of the consumption of 
constrained and unconstrained consumers. 
Ct = Cý + ctu 
where 
Q= Aggregate consumption 
Ct C= Consumption of constrained consumers 
Cý = Consumption of unconstrained consumers 
(2.25) 
We assume that unconstrained consumers receive a proportion k, of total post 
tax labour income, f4. Constrained consumers thus receive a proportion (I - ?, ý ) of total 
post tax labour income. Since they consume their current income, 
ct c= (I -x )f4 (2.26) 
If the value of ý. is estimated to be unity, then one can conclude that all consumers are 
forward looking. The aggregate consumption ffinction is thus a generalisation which 
includes the permanent income hypothesis as a special case. 
The consumption of unconstrained consumers may be defined following (2.7) as 
cu -oc+PCu , +e, t t- (2.27) 
where the error term e, is assumed to be normally distributed and uncorrelated to any 
information available to the consumer in period t- I including consumption in period 
t-1. Since changes in current income signal changes in future income, the error term 
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may include changes in consumption expenditure which occur due to the revision in 
expectation of future income. 
Aggregate consumption may be defined using (2.25) and (2-27) as Cý 
Ct =a+ ocu +Cc +e t- tt (2.28) 
Adding and subtracting OCt-I on the right hand side we get 
ct + o(CU + cc cc +e t-I t-, )+Ct -oct-I t (2.29) 
Lagging (2.26) by one time period and substituting in (2.29) and using (2.25) we 
obtain 
ct =a+ oct- I+ (I - k)(Qt - ont-, )+ et (2.30) 
X can be interpreted as the degree of excess sensitivity of consumption to current 
income. If there exist no credit constraints k should be one. 
2.5. Evidence for India 
To test the hypothesis for India we estimate (2.27), the constrained 
model, and (2.30), the unconstrained model. The model is estimated using annual data 
for India for the penod 1960 to 1989. The data source is International Financial 
Statistics published by the IMF (various issues). Variables are measured in real per 
capita terms. Per capita GDP is used as an instrument for f2t, the current disposable 
income. Since the error term may be correlated with f2t, we estimate the model by 
using instrumental variables. NLIV estimates using one period lagged values of 
consumption, income, private sector investment and government spending are 
presented in Table 2.1. We compute the Wald statistic to test the restrIction. 
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Table 2.1 : Excess Senstivity of Consumption 
Parameter Estimate 
[p values in parentheses] 
a 15.09 [0.039] 
p 0.30 [0.111] 
I-k 0.547 [0.000] 
Durbin Watson Statistic 1.93 
LM test for first order 
Serial Correlation 0.12 [0.727] 
LM test for functional form 1.64 [0.201] 
LM test for Heteroscedasticity 2.39 [0.122] 
LM test for Normality 2.80 [0.247] 
Wald test of restriction (k = 1) = 142.3 5 
Wald Statistic indicates that the restricted model is not the true model. 
This indicates that there is evidence of excess sensitivity of consumption to income. 
This suggests that the assumption of the Ricardian model that there are perfect credit 
markets is not true for India. The estimate of excess sensitivity may however be biased 
because we have not taken into account the effect of other possible violations of the 
Ricardian model into account. For instance, the presence of finite horizons, rather than 
infinite horizons as assumed here, would lead to a greater response of permanent 
income unconstrained consumers to current income than suggested by the model 
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n I, above. The would mean that our estimate of the degree of excess sensitivity, (1-ý, ) the 
proportion of income received by constrained consumers, is higher than what it would 
be if we took into account finite horizons. In the next chapter we extend the model to 
include the assumptions of finite horizons and population growth. 
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Chapter 3 
The Aggregate Consumption Function: Finite Horizons, Liquidity Constraints and 
Population Growth with Income Redistribution 
The model presented here is confined to the analysis of a closed economy. Non- 
Ricardian effects are introduced in the aggregate consumption function by the inclusion of 
liquidity constraints following Hayashi (1982), finite horizons following Blanchard (1985), 
population growth following Weil (1989) and aflowmg for a transfer of consumers fi7om the 
group of constrained (unconstrained) to the group of unconstrained (constrained) 
consumers. Any one of these factors leads to a deviation from Ricardian Equivalence. Time 
is discrete following Frenkel and Razin (1992). 
3.1. Liquidity Constraints 
As described in Section 2.5 the economy is assumed to comprise of two groups of 
consumers - the liquidity constrained consumers and the unconstrained consumers. The 
unconstrained consumers maximise utility subject to the intertemporal budget constraint. 
Their consumption expenditure can be more than or less than their current income. They 
have access to the credit market. Hence, they save or dissave. Assuming that a person is 
born with zero net wealth, they become owners of all the nation's financial and physical 
wealth. The component of wealth in the portfolio of an unconstrained consumer may be 
positive or negative. 
Aggregate consumption is the sum of the consumption of the constrained and 
unconstrained consumers. 
ct = Qc + QU 
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where 
Ct = Aggregate consumption 
Ct C= Consumption of constrained consumers 
Ct U= Consumption of unconstrained consumers 
We assume that unconstrained consumers receive a proportion k, of total post 
tax labour income, Qt. Constrained consumers thus receive a proportion (I - ý, ) of total 
post tax labour income. Since they consume their current income, 
Ct c(I-k )92t (3.2) 
If the value of k is estimated to be unity, then one can conclude that all consumers are 
forward looking. 
3.2. Finite Horizons 
The group of unconstrained consumers consist of overlapping generations which, 
apart from age, are identical. To capture the "fife-cycle" aspect and to deal vvith issues in K_ 
which the change in behaviour over fife are important, we would need to aflow for 
differences in propensity to consume across agents. However, t1iis makes aggregation 
impossible. To allow aggregation it is assumed, following Blanchard (1985), that agents 
face throughout their life, a constant instantaneous probability of death, p. Their expected 
life I/p is constant throughout life. The aggregation problem is solved because though 
aggents are of different ages and have different levels of wealth, they have the same horizon 
and the same propensity to consume. (1/p) the horizon index fies anywhere between zero 
and infinity. If we let p go to zero then we obtain the infinite horizon case as a lin-king case. 
As noted earlier, it is assumed that each agent is born vvith zero net wealth. 
Consumers leave neither assets, nor debt to their cWdren. The model thus assumes the 
absence of a bequest motive. Because of uncertain life-time and the assumption that debt is 
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not inherited by the borrower's children who would service it, it is assumed that each loan is 
associated with a direct surcharge on the loan which is an insurance prenuum. Perfect 
competition and the zero profit condition in the market for loanable funds would ensure 
that at the end of a penod, after taking nsk into account, each lender eams a return equal to 
the risk free return (I + r). Since a proportion p of the population is expected to die in 
each period, only a proportion (I - p) of the population is expected to survive. A 
competitive lender charges a rate of interest higher than r, the risk free rate of interest, 
because p per cent of the population is not going to be alive to repay the loan and pay the 
interest on it. The competitive lender thus charges (I + r)/(l - p) so that the safe return is 
(I - p) [(I + r)/ (I - p)] =I+r. 
Alternatively, it can be assumed that the agent owns assets which he lends out. He 
receives interest on Iýs assets. The borrower pays him a return R* that includes a life 
insurance prenýum in return for which he inherits the assets if the individual dies. Since only 
(I - p) proportion of the population is going to survive, 
he will end up paying only (I - p) 
R* and therefore if the secure rate of return is I+r, the zero profit condition ensures that 
(I - p) R* = (I + r)/(l - p). The effective cost of borrowing relevant 
for individual decision 
making is (I + r) / (I - p). To ease aggregation, we also 
ignore He-cycle aspects of 
labour income and assume that labour income is constant throughout the consumer's 
fifetime. 
3.3. Population Growth and Income Redistribution 
It is assumed that the economy is characterised by population growth and 
income 
redistribution. The population of unconstrained consumers is assumed to grow at the rate 
g. The total population over any period may be divided into four groups- 
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A. Those who were constrained at the beginning of the period and constrained at the end of 
the penod. 
B. Those who were constrained at the beginning of the period and unconstrained at the end 
of the penod. 
C. Those who were unconstrained at the beginning of the period and unconstrained at the 
end of the penod. 
D. Those who were unconstrained at the beginning of the period and. constrained at the end 
of the penod. 
Since our definition of unconstrained consumers is one that includes those who 
save or borrow depending on whether the component of wealth in their portfolio is positive 
or negative, a change in an individual's position ftom constrained to unconstrained can 
come about either by a change in the credit market such that more (or less) people have 
access to credit or by a redistribution of income. In a country where a credit market is 
developing or one where a developed credit market is liberalised, one would expect a 
number of consumers who are constrained at the beginning of the period to become 
unconstrained by the end of the period if they get access to credit during that time. If there 
was no change in the credit availability such a change could be the result of a redistribution 
of income fi7om the rich, who have the capacity to save, to the constrained. 
Group D consumers could either be the victims of tighter credit controls or a 
worsening of mcome distribution. Agents who were better off at the beginning of the 
period and could save a part of it, could become incapable of doing so by the end of the 
period due to a fafl in their real income. If the size of groups B and D was zero, both the 
constrained and the unconstrained groups are assumed to grow at the rate of growth of 
total population, g*. If in any period group B is larger than group D, then (g - g*), 
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where g is the growth in the size of the unconstrained group, wifl be positive. If group D 
is larger than group B, it suggests a net transfer from the unconstrained to the constrained 
group and (g - g*) wifl be negative. In the absence of transfers, the rate of population 
growth of the unconstrained group would be g*. In an economy undergoing structural 
change we would expect both group B and D to be non-zero. 
3.4. Utility Function 
The utility function is assumed to be of the constant elasticity of substitution type 
where the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is unity. A constant elasticity of 
substitution utility function may be written as 
I 
I-Y, U(C, ) 
ct 
ln(Ct) 
if > 0, 
if cy =I 
The single period utility function of the consumer is thus logarithmic. a is the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Consider the unconstrained consumer bom in period 
s. The unconstrained consurner's intertemporal utility ffinction at time t ý! s, in the absence 
of any uncertainty apart fi7om death is given by 
u- 
00 I-t 
logC'i, s + y, logG"s t's 
I ly 
Ii 
i=t 1+6 
(3.3) 
where 5 denotes the rate of time preference and CI, and U,,, denote the consumption of 
private and pubfic goods respectively over period (1, i+ 1). 
Wealth of an individual consists of two components: non-human wealth that 
includes physical and financial assets and human wealth which consists of the present value 
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of the expected future stream of labour income. Real net financial and physical wealth at the 
end of penod i is given by Vj,. At this stage we ornit taxation of non-labour income. The 
budget constraint of an individual may be defined as 
[(I +r)/(l -p)] Vl-j,, +Q%, -C'ý, (3.4) 
where unconstrained consumers receive Q, " which is a part of total post tax labour income, 
f4, and r is the risk fi7ee real rate of interest. r is assumed to be constant. Rewriting (3.4) 
as, 
Vi- 
I's 
= 
I+r 
(vi, +c- i" - Q'i") 
Solving forward in t4ne and substituting we have 
+(ý- . I+ I's i+ i's 
cui" 
(c u 
+r 
Combining with the transversality condition that wealth does not grow at a rate faster than 
the rate of interest i. e. JIM 
V"" 
0 we arrive at the consolidated budget 
i -> oc) + 
constraint over the individual's lifetime- 
t 
n. 
I+r v i+t, s I-I's 
t=o I+r t=o I+rIp 
(3.5) 
The consumer maximises utifity defined by (3.3) subject to the intertemporal budget 
constraint (3.5). The resulting Euler equation is linear as in (2.9) and of the fon-n- 
U 
+,, ýC u ýs = (I+r) / (I + 6) 
(3.6) 
Combining (3.5) and (3.6) leads to 
Uls 
= ýt [(I +r)/(l -p)V, -,, s +Hu ts)] 
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where ýt = (p + 6)/(l + 8) and H' ,, is 
human wealth of unconstrained consumers defined 
by 
uu i's i+t, s t=O 
), 
(3.7) 
In the infinite horizon case we found ýt = 6/(l + 6) [ (2.10)] which corresponds to p=O 
here. ýt Is again interpreted as the marginal propensity to consume out of lifetime wealth. 
The amount an individual consumes out of an additional unit of lifetime wealth at any point 
of time depends on how he weighs present consumption relative to future consumption and 
upon his probability of being alive to consume it later. If the degree of impatience was 
infinitely high, the rate of time preference 5 would be very high and ýt would be nearly 
unity. In other words, he would consume every extra unit of wealth right away. The lower 
the degree of impatience, the more the individual would be prepared to wait to consume his 
wealth and the lower would be the value of the marginal propensity to consume out of 
lifetime wealth. If the rate of time preference was zero, the marginal propensity to consume 
out of Heinle wealth would be equal to p, the reciprocal of the life expectancy of the 
individual. In that case it can be shown that if the individual expected to five for n years he 
would smooth his consumption out such that he consumes an equal amount in each year. 
Since here the marginal propensity is equal to the average propensity he would consume 
I /n amount of his wealth in each year. 
In terms of the probability of survival, the higher is the probability of survival, the 
lower is the marginal propensity to consume out of lifetime wealth because of the need to 
spread consumption over a longer period. If p is very high and the individual expects to five 
for a very short period he will consume a very high proportion of his wealth. If 5 and p are 
both low then ýi WIll be low as well. 
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3.5. Aggregate Behaviour 
We now look at the aggregate behaviour of unconstrained consumers to 
incorporate the effect of population growth and income redistribution. If L, is the size of 
the cohort bom during the period [s, s+ I] who are still alive at the end of period t then L. ý, 
= (1-p)"L, . 
The unconstrained group can increase or decrease m size both due to natural 
birth and transfer to and fi7om the constrained group. Let 0 be the 'birth rate' (assumed 
contant) that includes both birth and augration during a period such that 1-,,, = P(I-p)I-t-, 
where Lý, is the population bom in period t and still alive in period t. and L, is the 
population size at the end of the period. If g= population growth (assumed constant), then 
1, = (I +g)Lo. Hence we must have that 
Lt =(I+ g) t Lo 
tt 
L =)OLO I+ g)-1(1 - p)t-s+ 
I 
t's 
S---Oo S---Oo 
(3.8) 
Performing the summation leads to 1/(I+D) = (1-p) / (p + g) which determines the 'birth 
-p +g. rate' P. For smaH p, g we have 0= 
Aggregate variables are defined as- 
t 
cut Lt, C't, (3.9) 
S= -co 
t 
t's 
(3.10) H"t L Hut, 
S=-OC 
etc. Taking first differences of (3.10) we have 
t- I 
H't - H't- i=L, Hu tj + 
1] Hut, s -LHu t- I. S , 
[Lt, 
s t- I's S= -co 
The first tenn on the right hand side of (3.11) is equal to P(I-p)L, -, 
H' ,= P[(I-p) / 
(I +g)]IH' ý,. But IH " L, = H' t since human wealth of all age groups is equal according 
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to our 'perpetual youth' or constant probability of death assumption. Using (3.7) human 
wealth of cohort s accumulates according to - 
-p)] (H u 1-1, s -Q'i-,, s) (3.12) 
Using (3.12) and the definition of aggregate human capital, the summation on the right 
hand side of (3.11) can be shown to be (I+r)(H' t-I -0 u t-1). 
Hence aggregate human wealth of the unconstrained group accumulates according to 
11-P ('-P)I(I+g)]IT, 
= [(I-p)/(I+g)]Flu, = (I+r)(Hu, -, -Quj) 
+F-t 
Et - iid(O, s c) (3.13) 
F, t represents the revisions in the expectation of human wealth that are made 
in period t. 
Under the assumption that expectations are rational, it is orthogonal to the set of 
infonnation available to the household at t- I and is serially uncorrelated. Aggregate 
human wealth of unconstrained consumers may be expressed as 
00 
H't =I(Ip 
Q't + Et 
t=o 
(I + r)( Iý 
ý)) 
The presence of the growth rate of population in the expression for aggregate 
human wealth is indicative of the fact that the future expected labour income of those yet to 
join the unconstrained group (by birth or by transfer) is not owned by current households. 
Aggregate ffiture labour income is discounted by the real rate of interest augmented by the 
probability of survival and the rate of growth of population. 
V,, total non-human wealth, is defined as the sum of physical and financial wealth. 
Ignoring consumer durables physical wealth is assumed to be the total private capital 
stock Kt. Financial wealth is assumed to consist of Dt, the government 
debt held by 
households. Since households constitute the private sector and own all the private 
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capital stock, the sector as a whole does not have any other financial assets or liabilities 
in a closed economy apart from public debt. Individual household financial assets and 
liabilities in the private sector will balance out. We thus assume that the only financial 
wealth of the household sector as a whole is government debt. Thus 
Vt = Dt + Kt. 
If Vt is the sum of capital stock and financial assets in period t, we assume that 
the return earned on it is equal to r. If the net rate of return on capital stock was 
different from that on government debt then households would sell government debt 
and buy physical capital, assuming that no risks are involved in either. In equilibrium, 
therefore, the marginal rate of transformation which is the net return on capital is equal 
to the real risk free rate of interest. 
Aggregating financial and physical wealth, the first ten-n in the summation L, CP ý, 
Výt 
because the newly born consumers born in period [t, t+l] inherit no financial or physical 
wealth which can only start accumulating fi-om t+ I onwards. Hence, corresponding to 
(3.13) we have 
vt = (I+r)vt-l +f2ut - cut (3.14) 
where Vt is non-human wealth at the end of period t. 
The aggregate consumption function of unconstrained consumers is now 
cu, = ýt((I+r)V, -, + K) + ut; ut - 
ýd (o, Cy2u) 
where the random error term u, has been added to capture shocks to the consumer's utifity 
function. (3.13), (3.14) and (3-15) present our model of aggregate consumptIon of 
unconstrained consumers. 
The aggregate consumption function may be summarised as follows: 
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ct = ctc + ct u 
ctc --.: (i -x Pt 
Cut = g((I+r)Vt-l + Hut) + ut; ut - fid 
(O, o-2,, ) 
Vt = (1+r)Vt-l +nut - Cut 
H't = f(l+O (1+9)/ (1-p) j(H', -i + st; ct - iid (0, o;,: ) 
where 
C, =Aggregate consumption 
Ct'= Consumption of constrained consumers 
Ct" = Consumption of unconstrained consumers 
f4= post tax labour income 
post tax labour income of unconstrained consumers 
Vt = Non human wealth 
H", = Human wealth of unconstrained consumers 
X= proportion of total post tax labour income received by unconstrained consumers 
p= constant instantaneous probability of death 
r= the risk free rate of interest 
g= rate of growth of population of unconstrained consumers 
p= marginal propensity to consume out of lifetime wealth 
(= (p + 6)/(l + 6) where 6= rate of time preference) 
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Chapter 4 
Estimation and Results 
In this chapter we estimate for India the aggregate consumption function defined In 
the previous chapter. We discuss the difficulties encountered in estimation and present our 
methodology and results. 
4.1. Eliminating Human and Non-human Wealth 
Aggregate consumption is expressed as a function of human and non-human wealth 
and this creates difficulties for estimation. Human wealth R cannot be observed. There are 
two standard ways of dealing with this problem. The first method proposed by Hansen and 
Sargent (1980), seeks to obtain a closed forrn expression for H, in terms of observable 
variables. They assume that labour mcome is a part of an n-vanate autoregressive process 
and derive an explicit fonnula for fL which is linear in the current and lagged values of the n 
variables and non-hear in the discount ten-n and the coefficients in the autoregression. 
Estimates of parameters are obtained by estimating the consumption function and the n- 
vanate autoregressive process jointly by maximum likelihood. To make the number of 
parameters finite, it is necessary to assume that the order of autoregression is finite and 
known a pnori. The second method which we adopt fbHows Hayashi (1982) who avoids an 
expficit treatment of human wealth by eliminating human wealth from the function. 
Non-human wealth is held by households in many forms apaft from financial assets. 
These may be gold, houses etc. accurate measures for which are not easy as not only does 
their value fluctuate but they are also not always declared by households as part of their 
wealth. We can avoid this problem by eliminating non-human wealth from the equation. To 
59 
eHminate human and non-human wealth fi7om the consumption function of unconstrained 
consumers let us define oc=(I+r)(I+g)/(I-p); R=I+r. The lag operator is defined such that 
LY, t=Y, -,; L 
2)(t=YM-2and 
so on for any variable X. 
Ignoring the superscript u for unconstrained consumers for the time being, and 
rewriting the equations using the lag operator and rearranging, 
ýt[K +RLVt] + u, 
[1-aL]R= -aLf4 +Ft (4.2) 
RLVt = Qt-C, -V, (4.3) 
We multiply (4.3) by [I -aL] and subtract the resulting equation fi7om (4.2). Substituting the 
expression (Ct-u, )/ýt from (4.1) for FL+RLV, we express the consumption function as 
[I-. aL] (Q-ut)/Vt =[I -ccL] (Ct-Vt) - "Qt -f-st (4.4) 
The above expression does not contain the unobservable term human wealth and 
can be simpHfied and estimated along vAth (3.14) as a system of equations sirnýilar to the 
one in Hayashi (1982). However, the system of equations contains the variable non-human 
wealth, an accurate measure of which does not exist for India. Rearranging (4.2) gives us 
[92, -C, ]/[I -RL] 
Substituting in (4.4) we arrive at 
[I -(xL] (Ct-ut)/ýt = ([ I -aL]/[ I -RL]) [f2t -Ct]- f2t +[ I -aL] Ct -FFt 
We have now eliminated human and non-human wealth fi7om the consumption 
fi-inction of unconstrained consumers. Tlýs expression is equivalent to 
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C't + r) 
+g+ 1---p c Ut- (I+r)2 
I+g 
cu t-2 - 
-p 
1+81 1+8 
P+6) P+9) 
6) y- D _ 
ý) 
P+6 
+ 
P+5 
+8 1+ 6)61 +8) 
2 1+ 
1 
pg) 
I+glý-2-0+0 1+ Ut- I+ 1ý I-P p 
(4.5) 
The above defines the consumption fUnction of unconstrained consumers. 
From (3.1) and (3.2) we have 
C't 
= Ct - (I - ? ý, ) f2t (4.6) 
Lagging (4.6) and substituting for fft, Cu, -, andCut-2in 
(4.5) we get 
r) 
+g+I- P]C, 
-, + 
r)2 
I+ gCt-2 
-p 1+8 1+6 
I+ g+ 1-1n) + g) + r) 
[(I 
-p 
+ r)2 
I+g 
f2t-2 + Pt 
1+61 
where p, + r) 
p 8) 
6t-l +p8 &t 
+ 
+ r)2 
+g 
"t-2 + r) +I 
+ig 
ut-I + ut 
-p 
i- 
P) 
(4.7) 
The above defines the aggregate consumption function in terrns of lagged values of 
consumption and current and lagged values of post tax labour income. Both variables are 
observable and data can be obtained for them, so it is possible to estimate this equation. But 
before we do so, we look at some of its properties. 
4.2. Non-Linearity 
A preliminary exan-dnation of the above equation suggests that it may be rewntten as 
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Ct :::: ý (XI C-t-I + CC2 C-t-2 + OC3 f4 + (X4 ý4-1 + ()t5Qt-2 + Pt 
where 
oc, =(I+r) 
'+g 
+ 
I-P II-p 
1+61 
CC2 =+ r)2 
I+g 
OC3 = 
ot 4+ r) 
g 
[ 
I-P LIP + 1+9 1+8 ý+ 8) 
2 I+g 
Oc5 + r) - 1+8 
Therefore, OC5 :: ": -U-2 GC3and p, is the error term. 
(4.8) 
The model is then of the fon-n of an autoregressive distributed lag model with two lags of 
income and consumption and a moving average error term. However, if the model is 
estimated as a linear model we fail to take into account the non-linear restriction that 
OC5 ":::::: -(X2 (Y-3. 
If the five parameters cc,, .. -, a5 could 
be written as five one-to-one fUnctions of the 
set of five underlying parameters r, g, 6, X, and p then the model could have been defined 
as being intrinsically linear. However, here due to the non-linear restrictionCC5 = -a2 CC3 the 
I one-to-one' or identification condition is not met. If we were to estimate (4.8) by Non- 
Linear Least Squares method and solve the resulting 4 independent equations for the 5 
underlying parameters r, g, p, 5 and k, there would be no unique solution. 
4.3. Properties of the disturbance term 
We have defined the disturbance terrn as 
+ r) 
1) 
F-t_j +(P+5) F, t 
( 
-ili+-5 1+8) 
+ r)2 
I+ g 
tý-2 -(I+ rI+- I-P 
ý 
where ut - ýd(O, cyu 2) independent of F, - iid(O, cy,: 
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pt is thus a sum of two moving average processes, an MA(l) and an MA(2) process. Both 
ut andFt are identicafly and independently distributed with mean zero and constant variance. 
They are uncorrelated with each other at all leads and lags. 
Since the above error term is fairly non-standard we analyse it in some detail. We 
derive it's variance and autocovariance and define the variance-covariance matrix. Let us 
simplify it by redefining p, as 
Pt : ": 'ý+0A-, +02'ý-2+e, +ke, 
-, 
where et = 
5) 
& 
(-Ili++ 
5t 
0, = -(I + r)( I+ 
i 
-+99) I-P 
02 =(I+r)2 
I+g 
I-p 
+ r) 
2 
2), 2) 
C7e2= 
2 Since F-, - iid(O, a,, we have e, - 
fid(O, Cye where . 
Var(e, )= GE, 
Since the u, 's and F,, 's are uncorrelated with each other at all leads and lags and are white 
noise processes it can be shown that 
E(uiuj) = E(eiej)=O, i; j: 
= CYU2 (Y, 
2 
E(u, u, ) , 
E(eiei)= 
_, 
E(uiei-j) =0 for afl 
Using the above results we can derive the mean and variance of p, as 
E(pt) =0 
Var(pt)= (1+() 12 +02 
2)CVU2 +(I +k2)Cye 2 
=Gu 
2[(1+012 +02 2) +(1 +X2 )(Te 2/cy 
u 
2] 
:: --Gu yo, say 
The first autocovanance of p, is 
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(u, + 01 Ut-1 + 02 Ut-2+ et +Z et-, )x 
(Ut-1 + 01 Ut-2 + 02 Ut-3+ e, -, +ý 
et-2 
Cyu 
2+ kcy, 2 
==Cyu 
2[01( 1+02) + XCTe 2/cy 
u 
2] 
=-a. -y i, say 
The second autocovariance is 
E(PtPt-2)==Cyu 2 [021=Cyu 2 Y2, say 
AH other autocovariances are zero. 
E(p, p, -k)=O, 
k>2 
Thus P, 's are uncorrelated beyond two penods. 
The vanance-covanance matrix of the error term may be written as 
u V(P, ) cy, ý 
YO Yl Y2 0 0 0 0 
YI Y0 YI y2 0 0 0 
Y2 YI YO YI Y2 0 0 
0 y2 YI Y0 YI y2 
0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 Y0 'Yl Y2- 
0 0 0 y2 YI Y0 YI 
0 0 0 0 y2 YI Y0 
where T is the number of observations. 
C7270 
u 
2 li 
- 
jj 
= 
Uyl 
u 
CY 
2Y2 li -jl =2 
0 11 -jl >2 
lTxT 
Substituting for the expressions for O's and X we have 
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Yo )2 )4 
(Y 
1+ (I+r 1+ +(I+r 
(L+g 
+(I+(I+r)2) e 
9p 
p CF 
2 
u 
2 
)2 e y, 1+ 1+(I+r r 
ý 
-+g 
(-ý, 
_+-gý) 
(I 
+) 
ý12 
I-P 
Y2 -(I+r)2 
I+g 
I-p 
The error ten-n is thus a moving average process of order two. 
4.4. Generalised Method of Moments 
In a single equation dynamic model vvith serially correlated disturbances, a lagged 
endogenous variable on the tight hand side acts as a source of inconsistency for OLS or 
NLS estimators. If lagged values of consumption are not independent of the error term 
they do not satisfy the conditions for pre-deterrninedness. From the definition of the 
revision of expectations of human wealth we can see that labour income wil-I be correlated 
with e, which is included in pt. The error ten-n is thus correlated with the regressors. 
In the classical linear regression model 
X'D+u tt 
for xj a (kxl) vector of explanatory variables. The value of P, Po is assumed to satisfy the 
condition 
E(xtut) =0 
The consumption function we want to estimate contains lagged values of 
consumption and current and lagged values of the post tax labour income. It can easily be 
shown that Cov[C, -I, p, 
] :; tL 0 and COV[Ct-2, Pt] # 0. Further, since the error term contains F, 
the revision in the expectation of human wealth, we would expect the disturbance term to 
be correlated with current income as well. If current labour income changes, households 
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may revise their expectations of fiiture labour income. Since the disturbance term 
contains F-, and F-, -,, income and its 
first lag are correlated vAth pt. 
Thus xt, which in our case is a (5x I) vector of the explanatory variables that include 
lagged values of consumption and income, is not orthogonal to the error term. Or, E(xp, ): ý-, 
0. Suppose there exist a set of r variables that are uncorrelated vAth P, but correlated with 
x,. If z, is an (rxl) vector of such explanatory variables then E(Apt)=O are the r 
orthogonality conditions. 
If we define 0 as an (axl) vector of parameters we can define consumption as the ffinction 
h(yq, p). 
In our case defining 0 as a (5xl) vector of r, p, g, 6 and X we have 
h(x,, P) = (I + r) 
! 
-+g- + 
L-P 
+ r)' 
I+g CI-2 
II-p 
1+81 1+5 
+g1-I+ 
+ r) +p 
1 4-8 
( 
I-P +8 
1 ++ 
89 
+ r)2 
I+g f2 
t-2 
so that pt=Ct - h(xt, P) 
If Do denotes the true value of 0 then the population orthogonality conditions are 
E (zt (C, -h(xt, po))=O 
If the number of observations in the sample are T, the corresponding sample average is 
g(o) =I (z, (C, - h(xt, T 
identification requires an order condition (r > a) and the rank condition that the 
columns of the plim of D' be linearly independent where T 
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D^I Og(p) 
ap, 
P=ýT 
(Hamilton (1995), p. 422). A solution exists only if there are as many orthogonality 
conditions as there are co-ordinates in the parameter vector to be estimated. The attempt is 
to make the above sample version of the population orthogonality conditions as close as 
possible to zero. This is done by choosing a weighing matrix which selects the particular 
linear combination of orthogonality conditions that are to be used in estimation. 
It is required that the number of linear combinations of the sample orthogonality 
conditions are equal to the number of parameters to be estimated. A model is over- 
identified when the number of orthogonality conditions exceeds the number of parameters 
to be estimated or r>a. In this case more orthogonality conditions are used than are 
needed to estimate the parameters. Hansen (1982) suggested a test of whether al-l sample 
moments represented by g(P) are as close to zero as would be expected if the 
corresponding population moments E(z4(Q-h(x,, P)) were truly zero. If the true population 
moments are zero this gives us the test of over-identifying restrictions. If the sample 
moments that we obtain, using a linear combination of the instruments, is significantly 
different from zero,, then our sample average does not represent the true population 
moments. T. Q, where T is the number of observations and Q is the cntenon ffinction as 
defined below, has aX2 distribution with (r-a) degrees of freedom. If T. Q is not significantly 
different fi7om zero then we cannot reject the hypothesis that the sample moments are as 
close to zero as would be expected if the corresponding population moments were truly 
zero. The model is then said to be over-identified in the set of instruments. 
Hansen (1982) showed that the minimum asymptotic vanance of the estimator 
was obtained when P was chosen to nuninuse 
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Q= g(3)W1g(3) 
where 
12 
Id Cov[z 
ipi, zjpjl 
Tj 
=1 
zt 2: 
where Z is an (rxT) matrix of the T observations of each of the r instruments. E is the 
variance-covariance matnX of the error terin. 
that is chosen to minirnise the criterion function 
zliz g(o) 
[T 
2 
is known as the Generalised Method of Moments estimator and is both consistent and 
asymptoticafly efficient. 
An estimate of TEZ can be obtained by the Newey-West (1987) estimator as STwhere 
Iq s =S + 
1] 1)(§ +s 
T 0, T 
,fI -[v/(q 
+ V, t V. 
) 
V=j 
where 
T 
s 
VA 
11 zt ct - h(x,, t-V ct-v - 
h(x, 
-,, Tt= -, 1( 
( 0))(z 
v+ 
where is a consistent estimator of Po. q is the maximum lag length. Since we have shown 
that p, a sum of an MA(l) and an MA(2) process, is an MA(2) error process we set q to 2. 
To summarize, the estimation procedure we adopt is Hansen's (1982) Generallsed 
Method of Moments. A set of instruments with at least as many instruments as the number 
of parameters to be estimated is chosen. An estimate of the variance -covanance matrix of 
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the error tenn is obtained by the Newey-West (1987) procedure. The moving average 
process is specified to be of order two. If the system is overidentified in the set of 
instruments as shown by Hansen's (1982) test of overidentifying restrictions then the 
sample moments are expected to represent the true population moments. Esurnated 
parameters can be shown to be both consistent and asymptotically efficient. 
4.5. Approaches to Estimation 
It is pertinent at this stage to look at some of the existing studies to examine how 
they have approached the estimation of a similar consumption function. As far as I know, g, 
the measure of population growth and income distribution has not been explicitly estimated 
in any empirical work. Some other studies have estimated the consumption function under 
the assumption that p, the probability of death and/or I-k, the proportion of liquidity 
constrained consumers are zero. 
Hayashi(l 982) estimates the model for the US assuming infinite horizons. Non- 
human wealth is not deleted and the model is estimated as a two equation system 
comprising of the consumption function and the dynamics of non-human wealth. To begin 
with, he disregards the moving average process in the error ten-n and estimates the system 
by NLIV intending to use GMM if the residuals indicate the presence of serial correlation. 
He, however, finds no indication of significant autocorrelation and hence does not have to 
correct for it. 
Leiderman and Razin (1988) test for the Ricardian restriction that p=O, X=l for 
monthly data for Israel. The evolution of gross income and taxes is assumed to be governed 
by an autoregressive process of order one. The system is estunated by a non-finear least 
squares procedure. The rate of interest is imposed. Though the authors mention that some 
parameter estimates seem to be different from what is commonly accepted, the problem is 
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not dealt with. However, it is indicative of potentially severe n-iisspecificatIon. The estimates 
are beyond the feasible Rmits and do not satisfy the inequality restrictions imposed by 
common sense. The proportion of unconstrained consumers is estunated to be 209 per cent 
of the total population. The rate of time preference is estimated to be negative. While the 
likelihood ratio statistic fails to reject the Ricardian hypothesis these results are obtained in 
a potentially rnisspecified model. Estimates could be biased as a consequence of correlation 
between the error term and the regressors or the presence of serial correlation. 
Haque (1988) estimates the model for 16 developing countries assurning the 
absence of liquidity constraints. Both human and non-human wealth are eliminated fi7om the 
function. His estimate rejects the. hypothesis of finite horizons and thus supports the 
Ricardian model. This model was improved upon by Haque and Monteil (1989) who 
estimate it for a set of developing countries aowing for both liquidity constraints and finite 
horizons. The model is first estimated in linear form. It is reported that the signs of some of 
the coefficients were contrary to what was expected. For instance, they report that the sign 
of the estimated coefficient was at variance with theory most frequently for (x5. The 
equation is then estimated using NLIV to extract estimates of the underlying parameters. 
Values of I +r are imposed ranging fi7om 1.0 1 to 1.10 (with increments of 0.0 1), choosing 
the value that minimised the weighted sum of squared residuals. On the basis of the above 
tests it is concluded that the Ricardian hypothesis can be rejected for 15 of 16 countries for 
which the model has been estimated but due only to the effect of liquidity constraints and 
not finite horizons. The authors report that they uncover no evidence that 
households 
exhibit short time horizons. 
Darby and Ireland (1994) and the ESRC Macrornodelling Bureau (1993)(to re- 
estimate the Weale (1990) model) employ the Generalized Method of 
Moments for 
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estimating a consumption function for the UK. The system of equations consists of 
regressors that are correlated with the error term and there is a moving average process in 
the error ten-n. However, non-human wealth is included as a regressor. In our case, we 
eliminate wealth fi7om the consumption function. 
4.6. Data 
All variables were measured in real terms. Gross Domestic Product was used as a 
proxy for labour income as there are no accurate series available for labour's share of 
income. The only accurate series on wages and salaries are for those employed in the 
organised sector who are about 8 per cent of the labour force. In other words, accurate 
series for more than 90 per cent of the work force are not available. Since labour income is 
correlated with the revision in expectations in both the current and the following periods, 
which is a component of the error term, income and its one period lag are correlated with 
the error term and cannot be used as instruments. We use the second and third lag of 
income as instruments. Other instruments used were private and public investment, exports, 
imports, taxes, government consumption spending and fiscal deficit lagged by two time 
periods. 
A measure of aggregate consumption was used instead of aggregate non-durable 
consumption. This is not strictly correct because at any point in time consumption might 
arise without any act of consumer spending when, for example, a previously purchased 
consumer durable good is used. Also, consumer expenditure at time t would not 
correspond to consumption in time t when the expenditure includes the purchase of 
consumer durable goods. Ideal-ly one should add a flow of services fi7om previously 
purchased consumer durables to current consumer expenditure and subtract current 
expenditures on durable goods to obtain a correct measure of consumption. In an empirical 
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analysis of consumption, the measure of consumption should consist of consumer 
expenditures on non-durables and services and an imputed flow from the stock of consumer 
durables. 
Since data for durable consumption was not avaable no adjustment could be 
made. This might introduce some inaccuracy in our results, especially since the 
consumption of consumer durables in India has been rising. While total consumption shows 
an increase, current consumption does not increase as much if the increase is due to an 
increase in the purchase of consumer durables. If a consumer spends his current income 
partly on a consumer durable then he has not 'consumed' his entire income as the good 
gives him a flow of services In the future. If no adjustment is made in the data he may, for 
example, appear to be constrained when he would not be if consumption was measured 
accurately. 
The source of this data was various issues of the annual Econornic Survey 
pubfished by the Government of India and the Yearbook of International Financial Statistics 
pubfished by the International Monetary Fund. The fuH data set was avaýable for the period 
1951 to 1989. With two lags our sample period became 1953 to 1989. 
4.7. Restrictions 
The probability of death, p is assumed to be positive in the finite horizon case and 
zero in the infinite horizon case. Thus p is non-negative. We would expect the probability 
of death to lie between zero and one. Or, 0:!! ý p <1. 
The real rate of return on physical and financial capital, r, is equal to the marginal 
rate of product transformation in the economy in the long run. This is again non-negative. 
I +g, can be assumed to be non-negative as long as population grows at a rate higher than 
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-100 percent. If all labour income was earned by constrained consumers ? ý, would be equal 
to zero. And if there were no constrained consumers in the economy at all, k would be 
equal to one. We would thus expect 0 :! ý ý, :! ý 1. We assume that the rate of time preference 
is non-negative or, 6>0. There is either some impatience or none but it cannot be that 
consuming tomorrow is preferred to consuming today. 
We choose a sample period over which the underlying parameters were expected to 
be relatively stable since we are assuming that the value of the parameters we are estimating 
does not change over time. This assumption implies, for instance, that even if income 
distribution is changing and g is different fi-orn the rate of growth of the population, X the 
proportion of income received by the proportion of unconstrained consumers does not 
change significantly over this period. Unless the parameters could be estimated as time- 
varying, the model would be valid only for short time periods over which our assumption of 
the constancy of parameters is approximately true. We, therefore, need to choose a sample 
period which we believe would approximate these conditions better than any other. 
The 1950's was the decade immediately after independence and saw a rapid 
transfon-nation of the Indian economy. The 1980's vAtnessed substantial external borrowing 
and balance of payment deficits. In ten-ns of government poficies the beginning of the sixties 
to the end of the seventies was a relatively stable period as it did not see major changes. 
4.8. Estimation and Results 
The model cannot be estimated as defined by (4.7) because the rank condition 
for identification is clearly not satisfied. We therefore impose the value of p as a 
restnction. Assuming that the average planning horizons is 50 years the value of p is 
imposed at 0.02. The results obtained are presented below. 
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Estimate of (4.7) with the restriction p=0.02 
Parameter Estimate 
I+r 1.14163 
I+g 
. 
933232 
1/1+5 
. 
969000 
x 
. 
696562 
R-squared = . 
822669 Durbin-Watson statistic = 2.55465 
The rank condition still appears to be unsatisfied since the condition number (the ratio 
of the maximum to the minimum eigenvalue) of the correlation matnx of the parameter 
estimates is very high. The model may therefore still not identified. Restricting the 
model further by imposing a value of 0.7 for the proportion of income received by 
unconstrained consumers, we obtain the following results. 
Estimate of (4.7) with the restriction p=0.02; k=0.7 
Standard 
Parameter Estimate Error 
I+r 1.14163 1.11733 
I+g . 
933232 1041.83 
1/1+5 . 
969000 1080.20 
However, again the rank condition still appears to be unsatisfied by the same criterion. 
We impose the values of r and 6 to achieve identification. r, the real rate of return on 
physical and financial capital may be understood to be the marginal rate of product 
transformation since it is the return on capital. Rates of return of around 15 per cent are 
reported by the World Bank. At 3.2 per cent the value of 6, the subjective rate of time 
Standard 
Error 
1.14768 
1045.47 
1083.99 
100177 
preference of the unconstrained consumer, satisfies the non-negativity constraint imposed 
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by the assumption of rationality. If we impose r at 14.16 percent as above and the rate of 
time preference at 3.2 per cent we obtain the following results- 
Table 4.1 : An estimate of the rate of growth of population of unconstrained 
consumers 
Standard 
Parameter Estimate Error t-statistic 
I+g 
. 884747 . 059429 14.8875 
R-squared = . 
830332 Durbin-Watson statistic = 2.56419 
Q=0.265764 TQ= 5.57 (X2 = 19.0 at 5% significance level) 
The data is trending and given the small sample size it is difficult to reject the 
hypothesis that it is trend stationary in which case the t-statistics can still be assumed 
to be valid. Andrews and McDermott (1995) provide a justification for the use of 
standard asymptotic approximations in models with deterministically trending 
variables. The asymptotic distribution of generalised method of moment estimators and 
corresponding test statistics of deterministically trending variables are shown to be 
normal and chi-square respectively, the same as with non-trending variables. 
Our results may be surnmarised as follows-. 
Parameter Value 
r 0.14 
p 0.02 
9 -0.12 
0.032 
0.7 
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X. the proportion Of post tax labour income received by the group of unconstrained 
consumers is assumed to be 70 per cent. Though the 'constrained' group is not observable, 
it would not be unreasonable to suggest that the officially classified 'poor' who five below 
the poverty line and constituted nearly 50 per cent of the population in 1977-78, might be 
included in this group. This group receives nearly 18 per cent of household income. 
Further, nearly 70 per cent of the households who have an annual income below the 
national average receive about 35 per cent of total household income. We would 
consequently expect that the constrained group would constitute around 50 to 70 per cent 
of the total population and receive between 18 to 35 per cent of household income. A value 
of 0.7 of X suggests that I- X is 0.3 or the group of constrained consumers receives 30 
per cent of labour income. Since labour income constitutes the major component of 
household income, the figure seems reasonable. 
An interesting result which has emerged in this estimate is the value of g which is 
estimated to be -0.12. The negative value suggests a net transfer from the unconstrained to 
the constrained group. Since this is likely to be more country specific that the values of the 
other parameters, we need to look towards changes taking place in the Indian economy 
over that period to see if the evidence supports our results. 
4.9. Supporting Evidence 
A developing economy undergoing structural change, as it witnesses growth, is 
likely to find some sectors growing and others, like agriculture, declining. Within each 
sector as well, those in a position to adapt to the changing environment are able to maintain 
or improve their living standards, while others become worse off As India witnessed 
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economic growth led by a capital intensive manufacturing sector, the share of agriculture in 
GDP fell faster than the share of the population dependent on it. 
Table 4.2 Share of Agriculture in National Income 
Year Share of Agriculture and Allied Activity 
in National Income 
1950-51 54.04 
1960-61 56.05 
1970-71 49.19 
1975-76 46.76 
1984-85 37.91 
Source: National Accounts Statistics, CSO, New Deh. 
Table 4.3: Per Capita NDP in Agriculture 
Year Per capita NDP in Agriculture 
1970-71 prices (in Rs) 
1954-58 421.95 
1958-67 401.91 
1968-77 398.83 
1976-83 415.61 
Source- V. M. Dandekar (1986) "Agriculture, Employment and Poverty" EPW, Review of 
Agriculture, September. Vol. XM NO 38/39, pp A90-AIOO. Table 5 on pA-93. 
The share of agriculture in employment has remained about 70 percent. As Table 
4.3 shows, per capita NDP in agriculture fell. The effect of this decline was not evenly 
spread over the entire rural population as agriculture itself was undergoing both technical 
and institutional change. At the time of independence Indian agriculture was charactensed 
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by subsistence farn-dng, antiquated methods of production and land tenure systems. Land 
and labour productivity were nýserably low. Agricultural holdings were small and 
uneconornical. The pattern of land tenure, where the cultivator often did not own the land, 
had to pay high rents and had no security of tenancy, failed to provide incentives for 
improvement. Techniques of production were old and inefficient. Use of both farm yard 
manure and chemical fertilisers was little. Seeds were often of poor quality. Less than 20 
percent of the cultivated land was irrigated. 70 per cent of the population depended on 
agriculture and as the pressure on land grew, disguised unemployment increased. There 
was little scope for raising yields because of the lack of necessary infrastructure like modem 
inputs, irrigation, finance and marketing. 
In the 1960s the government adopted a policy of promoting modem agricultural 
techniques. The Green Revolution was charactensed by the availability of high yield variety 
and disease resistant seeds, fertilisers, pesticides, credit, marketing, storage facilities, 
agricultural machinery etc., in certain selected areas at first and then later provided to other 
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areas. These modem techniques, however, required substantial investment and only a small 
minority of fanners were able to undertake such expenditure (Rudra (1969)). 
The overwhehrdng majority of cultivators with small holdings were unable to reap 
the full benefits of modernisation. The cost of inputs rose faster than the price of output and 
there was a decline in their net income. ( Swamy and Gulati (1986)). In cases where small 
farmers also leased in part of their holdings, rising rentals and the tendency of landowners 
to resume land for self cultivation due to the high profitability of modem techniques, there 
was an absolute deterioration in the econonuc condition of the smafl-owner-cum-tenant 
cu tivator. 
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L X. J. As demographic pressure increased and techniques of production changed, small 
and medium peasants experienced a deterioration in their economic condition. While some 
were able to cope with this adverse environment, there is evidence that a large proportion 
of them became very poor. A significant proportion of those who could be described as 
I unconstrained' slipped below the poverty fine thus becoming qualified for what we might 
cafi 'constrained'. 
We assume that rural households belonging to the top four per capita income 
deciles who account for nearly 90 per cent of rural savings (NCAER (1980), p. 27) can be 
called 'unconstrained'. In a longitudinal study where a very large sample of families 
identified in 1970-71 were fbHowed through into 1981-82, it was found that there was 
significant evidence of large scale impoverishment of small and medium farmers. 
Table 4.4 indicates that there was a significant decline in the income of those rural 
households who were in the top four income deciles in 1970-7 1. 
Table 4.4: Change in income distribution in Rural India 1970-80 
Per capita income Mean level of income per earner (Rs. Percentage change 
decile (1970-71) per annum 1980-81 prices) over 1970-80 
1970-71 1980-81 (Follow through) 
7 4360.16 3684.25 -15.50 
8 4360.57 4151.30 -4.80 
9 6464.98 5106.45 -21.01 
10 12615.11 6903.52 -46.07 
Source- Change in household income, interclass mobility and income distribution in rural 
India -A longitudinal study, New Delhi, NCAER, 1986, Table 3.9. 
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On examining the evidence on household saving and income distribution we could 
identify at least one set of consumers who may be cafled constrained. This was the 
population officially identified 'poor'. The poverty line definition calls those people poor 
who cannot afford to meet a certain day requirement of food and the associated level of 
non-food items. The Planning Conunission estimated that in 1979-80 about 317 million 
persons (48.4 per cent of the total population) lived below the poverty fine which was 
defined as 'the mid-point of the monthly per capita expenditure class having a day calone 
mtake of 2,400 per person in rural areas and 2,100 in urban areas. At 1979-80 prices these 
mid-points were Rs. 76 in rural areas and Rs. 88 in urban areas. 50.7 per cent of the rural 
population and 40.3 per cent of the urban population was identified as poor (Planning 
Commission (198 1)). Since these consumers accounted for hardly 5 per cent of household 
savings (NCAER (1980), p. 27), they fit into our definition of constrained. 
Though we would expect many of those eaming more than this low level of 
income, to be constrained, we do not attempt to identify the entire group of constrained 
consumers. It would suffice to say that we assume that persons living below the poverty 
fine form a subset of the set of constrained consumers. 
If a group of persons who fon-nally belonged to the set of unconstrained 
consumers, slipped below the poverty he we could say that they migrated from the 
unconstrained to the constrained group. This could be said for a significant proportion of 
small and medium peasants who become 'poor'. By 1981-82, a large proportion of the top 
four 1970-71 deciles were officiafly 'poor'. 
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Table 4.5: Changes in Poverty in Rural India, 1970-80 
Per capita income decile Percentage below poverty Line 
(1970-71) 1970-71 1981-82 
6 27.09 44.06 
7 0.00 51.12 
8 0.00 49.45 
9 0.00 40.90 
10 0.00 32.61 
Source: Changes in poverty and consumption pattern in Rural India between 1970-71 and 
1981-82 -A longitudinal analysis, NCAER, New Deh, 1986, Table 2.1. 
Let us now look at another subset of the group of unconstrained consumers. 
Organised sector workers are the richest class of workers whether in tenns of per capita 
consumption or incidence of poverty. They form only 8 per cent of the work force. In the 
organised sector employment grew rapidly up to 1965-66 and has only kept pace with 
population thereafter. During tl-ýs time, very impressive increases occurred in per worker 
incomes in the organised sector. Public sector workers more than doubled their real income 
between 1960-61 and 1984-85. The real incomes of private orgatused sector workers rose 
by more than 60 percent. In the unorganised sector, where workers employed are amongst 
the lowest paid, there was no trend increase at all in the income per worker either of those 
who were wage workers or those who worked in agriculture (Sen (1988)). 
If we identify organised sector workers as a subset of the set of unconstrained 
workers, the above evidence suggests that the size of this group was not expanding faster 
81 
than population growth. Real incomes of those we may consider constrained who were 
employed in the unorganised sector were not rising and the ratio of their average incomes 
to organised sector workers feH fi7om about a third in the sixties to a fifth in the eighties 
(Sen (1988)). There is no evidence of a net transfer to the 'unconstrained' group. 
The ratio of Gross Domestic Savings to GDP increased fi7om 6.8 percent in 1953- 
54 to 23.7 percent in 1990-9 1. Even over the period of estimation the savings ratio changed 
substantiaRy. It increased fi7om 11.9 percent in 1959-60 to 23.2 percent in 1978-79. This is 
in conformity with the hypothesis of a worsening income distribution. 
The following decade of the eighties VAtnessed a surprisingly large build up of 
unsold food stocks in the Indian economy. This happened at a time when per capita NDP in 
agriculture remained stagnant and per capita food production for the population as a whole 
increased only marginally. The food surplus has been attributed to underconsumption of 
large sections of the rural population whose purchasing power was timited by declining 
income (Patnaik, 1987). 
To summarise, our estimate suggests that a transfer has been taking place 
fi7om the group of 'unconstrained' consumers to the group of 'constrained' consumers. The 
causes of this transfer can be located in the nature of India's development process - the 
pattern of industrial and agrarian growth. The growth of a capital intensive manufacturing 
sector has not created adequate employment and 70 per cent of India's population 
continues to depend on agriculture. Only about 8 per cent of the work force Is employed in 
orgamsed industry and this proportion has not risen sInce 1964-65. Modenusation of 
agriculture has been accompanied by large scale impoverishment of the mass of small 
peasants and about 40 per cent of the population still fives below the 'poverty fine'. As India 
develops from a predominantly agrarian to a modem industrial nation, the traditional 
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peasant is the most likely to be displaced first. Unless other sectors grow sufficiently fast to 
absorb the labour force released by agriculture, the impoverishment of a large section of the 
population is likely to continue. 
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Chapter 5 
Policy Evaluation in an Endogenous Growth Model 
Recent developments in growth theory have shifted the focus of attention from the 
effects of fiscal policy on the levels of saving and consumption to those on growth. In 
traditional growth models the long-run rate of growth was determined by the rate of 
exogenous technical progress. Growth rates across economies with access to this 
technology were expected to converge. Failing to observe such convergence across the 
world, attempts have been made to explain the differences in long-run growth rates in 
terms of economic activity within each economy. In the new theory growth rates are 
determined by endogenous factors like the accumulation of knowledge and human 
capital ((Romer (1986), Lucas (1988)), R&D (Romer (1990)), or public infrastructure 
(Barro (1990)). Output displays increasing or constant returns to these factor inputs in 
the aggregate production function because of the externalities involved. 
As we have seen earlier, the representative agent Barro-Ricardian model with 
infinite horizons predicts debt neutrality. If government financing policy does not affect 
aggregate consumption and investment, it has no effect on growth in either exogenous 
or endogenous growth models given government spending and its composition. 
However, in an exogenous growth, overlapping generations model with Yaari- 
Blanchard-Weil consumers, financing policy affects the levels of consumption, saving 
and investment. The growth rate, being determined by the rate of technical progress 
that is exogenously given, is not affected. 
In an endogenous growth overlapping generations model with Yaari-Blanchard- 
Weil consumers and distortionary taxes, financing policy affects both the level of 
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consumption, saving and investment and the rate of growth. In this chapter ýý, -e shall 
adopt such a model of endogenous growth and analyse the effect of budgetary policy 
in India. The driving force behind economic growth is assumed to be a combination of 
R&D, learning by doing, human capital and public infrastructure. 
5.1. Traditional Models of Growth 
In the traditional model of growth the assumption of diminishing returns to capital 
in the production of output leads to a decreasing rate of return on investment and rate 
of growth of output. In the absence of technological change per capita, output 
converges to a steady state value with no per capita growth. Sustained economic 
growth is possible when technological progress takes place. It is assumed that this 
technological progress is a function of time and is exogenous to the production 
function. The production function which relates output to the stock of accumulated 
physical capital goods and labour displays decreasing returns with respect to each of 
these factors of production. Given the amount of labour employed, an increase in the 
stock of capital yields a less than proportionate increase in output. Technical change, 
however, can prevent this tendency towards a zero rate of profit. In its absence, capital 
and output would grow at the rate of growth of population such that the per capita 
growth rate is zero; but in the presence of labour augmenting technical change, capital 
and output can grow at the sum of the rate of growth of population and the labour 
augmenting technical progress. The long-run growth rate is thus imposed on the model 
and not determined by economic activity witl-iin it. 
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5.2. Endogenous Growth 
Extending the work of Arrow (1962) and Uzawa (1965), Romer (1986) 
relcindled the debate on what determines long-run growth questioning models of 
exogenous growth and convergence. He proposed an alternative view for prospects of 
long term growth where per capita output can grow without bound and even at a 
monotonically increasing rate. With increases in the stock of capital, the rate of 
investment and the rate of return on capital may increase rather than decrease. This is 
essentially due to the departure from the assumption of diminishing returns that is 
made in traditional models (Ramsey (1928), Cass(1965) , 
Koopmans (1965)). The 
model endogenises knowledge or technological progress that drives long-run growth. 
Investment produces knowledge. It is not merely the firm creating the knowledge that 
benefits; other producers benefit from it as well. Knowledge as an input has positive 
external effects on the production possibilities of other firms. In the aggregate 
production function for consumption goods, the stock of knowledge as an input 
exhibits increasing returns, so it will not be optimal to stop acquiring knowledge at any 
stage. This is in contrast to a situation where it is optimal at some stage not to use an 
additional unit of capital because its marginal product is diminishing. The production 
of knowledge is assumed to be subject to diminishing returns, doubling investment in 
research and development will not double the stock of knowledge. The assumption of 
diminishing returns in the production of knowledge is required to ensure that 
consumption does not grow too fast. 
Romer's (1986) model departs essentially ftom earlier models in the 
assumption that knowledge is assumed to be an input with increasing or at least 
constant marginal product. Production of the consumption good is assumed to be 
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globally convex, not concave as a function of the stock of knowledge when all other 
inputs are held constant. Without upsetting the basic argument the definition of this 
input can include the know-how acquired through learning by doing, R&D, the 
accumulation of human capital through education, public infrastructure and other 
factors of production that have a public good character and exhibit externalities. 
Barro (1990) defines the production function to include the input of 
public services which raise the productivity of private capital. The government invests 
in both the material infrastructure like public highways, railways, telecommunications 
and the immaterial infrastructure like education and training, and health. He 
incorporates a public sector into an endogenous growth model where he assumes 
constant rather than diminishing returns to a broad concept of capital which 
encompasses both human and non-human capital. The role of public services as an 
input to private production creates a potentially positive linkage between government 
and growth. In other words, Barro assumes that even with a broad concept of private 
capital that includes physical capital, human capital and aspects of privately owned 
knowledge, production displays decreasing returns to private inputs if complementary 
infrastructure does not expand in a parallel manner. Constant returns apply to this 
broad measure of reproducible capital as long as the public service input changes in the 
same proportion as private capital. 
The effect of finite horizons is incorporated in an endogenous growth model by 
Alogoskoufis and van der Ploeg (1990) who show that fiscal policy is not neutral when 
the probability of death is positive. Alogoskoufis and van der Ploeg (199 1) and Butter 
(1991) include the effect of both finite horizons and population growth in a model of 
endogenous growth and reach similar conclusions. Tax distortions in the form of a flat 
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rate income tax is incorporated by Barro (1990) who does not include the above 
Blanchard-Weil non-Ricardian effects but assumes externalities arising from the flow 
of public services. Externalities arising from the stock of public capital have been 
incorporated in Jappelli and Meana (1994). Our specification provides a generalisation 
of the above models and incorporates the various mechanisms by which fiscal policy 
can affect the long-run growth rate. In this model fiscal policy has both a supply side 
and a demand side effect. 
5.3. The Model 
We develop an endogenous growth model which draws upon early chapters 
capturing non-Ricardian Blanchard-Weil effects due to finite horizons and population 
growth and includes tax distortions and externalities due to public capital stock as in 
Krichel and Levine (1995) and Futagan-ý, Morita and Shibata (1993). We also include 
the effect of liquidity constraints on the demand function. The structure of property 
rights is such that in equilibrium new generations are born with endowments whose 
value nses at the endogenous rate of growth. This way they have a claim to some share 
of the capital stock in existence when they are born as it is absorbed in their human 
capital (Buiter (1991)). This is ensured in the model by allowing workers to 
appropriate the returns created by an economy-wide production externality. In Barro 
(1990) the externality arises from the flow of public services while we include the 
effect of past government spending on education, health, infrastructure, etc. by 
assuming that the externality arises from the stock of public capital. Behaviour of 
consumers, producers and the government determine the output equilibrium 
conditions. 
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We present a closed economy model driven by capital externalities arising 
from public and private capital. The closed economy assumption may not be strictly 
true for India today but considering the technical difficulties involved in an open 
economy endogenous growth model, we keep the analysis simple by assuming a closed 
economy. Further, since imports account for about 10 per cent of GDP and the current 
account deficit stands at 0.1 per cent of GDP, our results should not be significantly 
affected by this assumption. 
5.3.1. Households 
The aggregate consumption function is as defined in Chapter 3. We include 
distortionary taxes at the rate -c. Capital is assumed to earn a rate of return rt in period 
and depreciate at the rate 7c. Defining the consumption of unconstrained consumers as 
a function of W",, the total wealth of unconstrained consumers at the beginning of 
period t and ignoring the error terms we have, 
ýtwu 
Wt" + (I + rt (I - -c))V, 1 t- 
Human wealth in period t can be shown to be 
(5.2) 
Qu ut+ rt 
+ g) [H't-i 
- t-11 
(5.3) 
1-p 
(5.1) 
Labour income earned by unconstrained consumers is 
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Qu 
t= ý-(Y, - (r, + Tj (5.4) 
Since aggregate consumption of unconstrained consumers depends on the value of 
lifetime wealth, the evolution of consumption depends on the evolution of wealth. We 
therefore turn to the evolution of aggregate wealth which is a combination of human 
and non-human wealth. 
(3.14) may be redefined in the presence of distortionary taxes as 
(I +r(I -r))V, -, +KY, - C', 
Using the above, (5.1) and (5.2) we obtain 
Wt" =p+9 fg ++ rt -C)] 
P wtu 1 (5.5) 1+g +6 
The value of wealth in period t is expressed in terms of its value in period t- I and in 
terms of human wealth in period t. The evolution of aggregate wealth thus depends 
upon its composition. It reflects the asymmetry between human and non-human 
wealth. If the probability of death were zero and there was no population growth, we 
would have 
P+ rt(i -u wtu -1 +6 vvt-1 
(5.6) 
The asymmetry thus disappears with the removal of uncertainty regarding the length of 
life and the evolution of wealth no longer depends on the magnitude of human wealth 
in the current period. It depends on its aggregate value rather than its composition. 
From (5.1 and (5.5) it follows that 
++ rt Q- -r)] 
IP Ct" (5.7) C tu 1 +5 t-I 
90 
If g=O , p=O , -c =0, and for a constant rate of interest, Ctu = 
I+ r Cu which I+g I- 
corresponds to the Euler equation in the representative agent model with infinite 
horizons. In addition if there are no liquidity constraints then aggregate consumption 
Ct +r Ct_l 
. This shows that non-Ricardian behaviour of aggregate consumption 
arises from four sources: finite horizons, population growth, distortionary taxes and 
liquidity constraints. Effect on growth on each of these sources will be explored later. 
Using (5.1) ), (5.2) and (5.5) we have 
I+g u P+ö =[i+«I-T)] +-g - TA Vt- (5.8) t t-1 
+,. 
)(1 g)[i+«, l+8 
-p 
which describes the consumption behaviour of the unconstrained consumers in terms 
of lagged consumption and lagged non-human wealth. This may be referred to as the 
discrete time Yaari-Blanchard consumption function. ' 
5.3.2. Private Sector Output and Investment. 
The representative firm f produces homogeneous output with the following Cobb- 
Douglas constant returns to scale production function at time t 
Y =F(K,, f, J,, f)=K"t, fJ 
I-cc t'if t1f 
(5.9) 
where K, rf is private physical capital and 
J, f is labour input in efficiency units. Or, 
Jt, i et, iLt'i 
(5.10) 
where F, ,f is a measure of 
the efficiency of raw labour input Lt. The crucial 
assumption that drives endogenous growth in this model is that this efficiency measure 
is a function of the economy-wide capital-labour ratio . 
Let Kt be aggregate private 
For small r, g, p, X and 6 this corresponds to the 
C= (r-8)C - (p+g)(p+5)V in continuous time. 
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capital. In addition to the externality from private capital, the government affects 
labour efficiency by providing physical capital in the form of infrastructure which may 
be broadened to include education, health, etc., accumulated out of the economy's 
single output. This is captured by 
& 
t, f Ai 
(K) (K) 1-y, 
L 
(5.11) 
where KG, is public capital and yj is the contribution of public capital to the economy- 
wide efficiency of labour. This way workers inherit the benefits of past investment. 
Assuming identical firms that are constant in number, and aggregating, we arrive at the 
aggregate production function 
y2G 1-Y2 
Yt = 
ýKý) (K 
t) (5.12) 
where Y2=1- (1-(x)yl and B depends on the constant number of firms in the economy. 
It is assumed that the government does not produce. It buys output, including 
roads, dams, canals, hospitals, schools etc., from the private sector. This infrastructure 
is made available to the private sector without any user charges. Private capital has a 
a2yt 
t- <0. However, if the dirninishýing marginal product given by aK2 
t 'Y2(1 - yj)% 
t Kt 
ratio of public to private investment remains constant, i. e. with every increase in 
private investment there is a corresponding increase in public investment, then the 
marginal product of private capital is constant and is equal to its average product. The 
average product of capital may be expressed as 
yt 
=BG. 
) 1-Y2 
(5.13) 
Kt t 
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If the ratio 
KG' 
is a constant then the production function displays constant returns to Kt 
the input private capital and technology is linear . 
Also, if yj=O i. e. public expenditure 
has no role to play in raising the efficiency of labour then YT"ý1 and the production 
function can be expressed as Y=BKt as in Romer (1986) where B>O is the constant net 
marginal product of private capital. Technology in this case is linear. 
We assume that firm f ignores the externality in choosing capital stock. The 
marginal product of capital is NVK= DY/, DK = (xK'-' J'-' = (xY/K. The marginal cost of 
capital (including depreciation at a rate 7r)=rt+7r. Equating the private marginal 
product of capital to the cost of capital gives 
Kt (X 
--= K(r) Yt rt + 71 
(5.14) 
Net private investment is then given by the addition to capital stock less the 
depreciation in period t 
It = Kt - (I - Tr)Kt-, (5.15) 
5.3.3. The Government 
The government provides an amount Gc, of public consumption goods using the 
same technology as for the privately produced good, and purchases an amount GI, of 
the latter to invest in infrastructure. Total government expenditure is then 
Gt = Gct+Gl, which is financed by a combination of taxation (Tt) and borrowing (D, ) 
where D, are single period bonds. (We ignore or rule out seigniorage). The 
goverrurnent borrowing identity is given by 
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Dt = (I + rt)Dt -I + 
Gt - Tt (5.16) 
and public sector capital accumulates according to 
n)K 
G1+ Gtl t- (5.17) 
assun-ung the same depreciation rate as in the private sector. Since the defiru I of 
capital is broad, public sector investment GIt is assumed to include public expenditure 
on health, education, etc. Since only profits net of depreciation are taxed at the rate T 
total receipts are 
Tt=-c (Yt-7cK, ). 
5.3.4. Output Equilibrium. 
We assume that the market always clears. Equilibrium in the output market gives 
Y =C +1 +G tttt (5.19) 
Thus, given the government choice of fiscal policy variables Gct, GI, and T, the supply 
and demand sides of the economy are now fully determined. 
5.3.5. The Steady-State 
We seek a balanced growth steady-state in which all stocks and flows are growing 
at the same enclogenous rate n, the steady-state value of nt. The debt/GDP ratio is 
assumed to be constant which is the strong solvency condition. It is assumed that rt is 
constant at the rate r. If we express all macroeconon-iic stock and flow variables as 
ratios of GDP then in steady state balanced growth the ratios remain unchanged. We 
retain the same notation without the subscript t to denote these ratios to ease 
notational burden. 
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Consumption of constrained consumers who receive only labour income and 
consume their entire income is given by 
(r+ 7c)K, 
XI 
- -c (5.20) 
We can substitute for the expression for non-labour income from (5.14) where Kt(r+Tc) 
Post-tax labour income of unconstrained consumers can be now defined in 
terms of total income. Consumption of constrained consumers defined as a ratio of 
GDP in the steady state is 
ýtc =c =(I-k )(I-CCXI--c yt 
(5.21) 
We can now obtain the consumption of unconstrained consumers in the steady state 
from 
(p+g)(p+5)[1-r(I-t)]/(I-p))(D+K) 
(5.22) 
The capital output ratio may be expressed as a ratio of GDP as 
K(r) = oc /r+Tc (5.23) 
Given that the rate of depreciation for public capital is the same as that for private 
capital we obtain public capital in the steady state as a ratio of GDP as 
(I + n)Gl (5.24) 
(n + 7E) 
where G1 is the share of public investment in GDP. 
The aggregate production function can be expressed as a ratio of GDP as 
G' 
0 log B+ *y 2 logK+ 
(1 - Y2)109- (5.25) (n +7r) 
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In the steady state public and private capital grow at the same rate n and depreciate at 
the same rate 7r. Thus the ratio of public to private capital is constant and so 
production is linear in private capital. 
In a steady state public debt grows at the rate n. Thus the government budget 
constraint may be expressed as 
(I+n)Dt = (I+r)Dt-I + Gt -Tt (5.26) 
Rearranging, we express the solvency condition in the steady state as 
[(r-n)/(I+n)]D =T -G =[1-7cK], c -G (5.27) 
The market equilibrium in the steady state may be defined as ratios of GDP as 
I=C'+C'+l +G 
--c)-[(n+7c)/(l +n)]K(r)-G (5.28) 
To summarise the steady-state form of the model may be expressed as 
[1-r(1-t)J/(1-p)} (D+K) 
[(r-n)/(l+n)]D=T-Cx--(1-7cK(r)), u-G 
K=a / r+7c=K(r) 
logB+Y2 log(K(r))+(I-Y2)log(yGI(n+n))ýO 
cu=l-[(n+7c)/(l+n)]K(r)-G-(I-X) (1-a)(l-, c) 
(5.22) 
(5.27) 
(5.23) 
(5.25) 
(5.28) 
(5.21) 
(5.22) defines the aggregate consumption of the group of unconstrained consumers. 
(5.27) is the solvency condition of the government in the steady state. It is the strong 
solvency condition which implies that the debt/GDP ratio is constant. (5.23) and (5.25) 
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describe the supply side of the model. (5.23) defines the steady state capital output 
ratio. (5.25) defines the production function. (5.28) is the market equilibrium 
condition. Together these define consumption, the government budget constraint, 
production and market equilibrium in the steady state. 
Futagan-ii, Morita and Shibata (1993) who assume externalites arising from the 
stock of public and private capital on the supply side and from distortionary taxes on 
the demand side find that the steady state equilibrium path is unique and exhibits 
saddlepath stability. In a model of overlapping generations and enclogenous growth 
where externalities on the supply side arise from the stock of capital and on the 
demand side due to finite horizons, Alogoskoufis and van der Ploeg (1991) also find 
that the steady state equilibrium is saddlepath stable. The condition of solvency of the 
public sector is sufficient to ensure saddlepath stability. Corresponding to this 
boundary condition there is a single value of the forward looking variable - 
consumption at some initial time for which the system converges to a steady state. For 
all other initial values of consumption we have explosive behaviour. Strictly speaking, 
the stability of the steady state equilibrium in our model can be examined by linearizing 
around the steady state and investigating the transitional dynamics. However, since our 
model is later shown to be near Ricardian,, it is very close to Futagami, Morita and 
Shibata (1993) and so we can draw upon their results and assume that the system will 
exhibit saddlepath stability. 
5.4. Fiscal Policy and Long-Run Growth 
This section studies the steady-state of the economy defined above. Given fiscal 
instruments, -c, GC and GI we have five equations In five endogenous vanables 
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r, C,, D,, K and growth n. Since we wish to focus on the effects of government debt D. 
the distortionary tax rate -c, and the mix of government spending as between 
consumption and investment, we will characterise fiscal policy in terms of D and -i 
making total government spending endogenous. Let GI=yG making the third fiscal 
instrument the proportion y. 
To compute an "order of magnitude feel" for their effects on long-run growth we 
derive multipliers for estimating the change in the rate of growth when there is a 
change in fiscal policy variables. 
Substituting the value of consumption and eliminating G we arrive at the Yaari- 
Blanchard consumption relationship. 
f(n, r, D, -c)=((I+g)(r(l--c))+g-5-n(1+6))(l-[(n+7c)/(l+n)]K(r) 
+ [(r-n)/(1+n)] D-t(1-itK(r)-( 1-?. )( 1-r)(1-a))) 
-I(p+g)(p+6)[l+r(l-, u)]/(I-p))(D+K(r))=O (5.29) 
The production function may be derived as 
g(n, r, D919Y)ýY21ogK(r)+(I-Y2)(109Y+109('E(I -nK(r)- [(r-n)/(I+n)] D)+Iog(l+n)- 
log(n+-K)) +IogB=O (5.30) 
The two relationships determine r and n given D, -c and y. 
The relationship f(n, r, D,, r)=O describes the locus of interest and growth rates 
consistent with Yaari-Blanchard consumption behaviour, output equilibrium, private 
sector investment and the government budget constraint. We term this locus the Yaari- 
Blanchard (YB) curve. The relationship g(n, r, D,, r, y)=O is the locus consistent with 
balanced growth and our linear technology, private sector investment and the 
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goverment budget constraint. We call the relationship the linear technology (LT) 
curve. 
Consider incremental changes in the exogenous fiscal variables dD, dT, dy and the 
corresponding incremental changes dn and dr along the YB and LT curves. 
Differentiating, these incremental changes satisfy 
fndn+fr dr +fDdD +fcdz =O 
9ndn +grdr+gDdD+grd-c + gydy--O 
where it can be shown that under very lax conditions we expect f,, g,, g, >01 
fn, fD, fc, gn, gr, gD <0 (Details are presented in Appendix B). Keeping fiscal policy and 
income distribution fixed, the slope of the YB curve is given by (c-'n/c9r)f-O=-f r/ fn 
Since fn <0 and fr >0 therefore - fr/ffi > 0. In other words, (cn/or)f-o >0 or the YIB 
curve is upward sloping. Turning to the LT curve when fiscal policy is given, its slope 
is given by (an1&)g=O = -gr/ gn where we expect gn `ý 0 and gr `ý 0 and so, the LT curve 
is downward-sloping. In the case when public investment is irrelevant and Y2: --": l as in 
Romer(1986) we have K(r) =B and the LT curve is vertical. In an exogenous growth 
model the rate of growth is not affected by the rate of interest and the LT curve is 
honzontal. 
We now look at the effect of fiscal variables on the YB and LT curves. To look at 
the effect of a change in the ratio of debt to GDP let dr--d-c=O. We then have 
f. d,, +fDdD=O. Given dn/dD=-fl)/f,, if f., fD<O, dn/dD <0. Thus growth decreases as a 
result of the rise in debt everything else remaining constant. The YB curve shifts down. 
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Similarly, keeping r, -c and y fixed, dr--d-c=dy=O, we have gndn+gDdD=o and so 
dn/dD=-gE'/gn 
-If 9D, gn<O then dn/dD<O and the LT curve shifts downwards when debt 
increases. The combined effect of an increase in debt is a reduction in long-run growth. 
The Yaari-Blanchard and Linear Technology Curves : 
Effect of a rise in the Debt/GDP ratio 
rate of 
growth 
n 
r rate of interest 
Figure 5.1 
We can derive the debt/GDP ratio multiplier 
[aNADD] g, fD-gDf gf r' 
frgn- 
rn 
wherefrgn-g f<0. From the expected signs of the partial derivatives we can expect rn 
to be negative. This implies that an increase in the steady state ratio of public 
debt to GDP reduces long-run growth given the ratio of government consumption to 
government spending and the tax ratio. This effect is not contrary to our expectations 
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in a non-Ricardian world. Since public debt is considered net wealth in such a world, 
an increase in debt would raise consumption spending and reduce private savings 
available for investment. It should thus have a growth reducing effect if long-run 
growth depends on the level of investment. 
Let us now look at the effect of a change in the tax rate. We assume that dr--dD=O. 
Now, f,, dn+fd-c=O or dn/d-c=-f, /f,,. If f, f,, <0 as expected, dn/dT <0. In other words 
when the tax rate increases less is available for private sector saving and investment 
and when investment is lower, the growth rate is lower in an endogenous growth 
model. Hence the YB shifts down. 
To look at what happens to the LT curve, let dr--dD=dy--O. We have g. dn+g, d-c=O. 
So, dn/d-c=-g, /g,,. If g, >O, g,, <O then dn/dc >0. The LT curve shifts upwards when the 
tax rate increases. This is because more can be invested by the government while 
satisfying its intertemporal budget constraint. The total effect of the change in tax rate 
in not clearly in any one direction. We can derive the tax rate multiplier as 
gf [G-N/O']D, y 7--g, 
fr-gTfr / fr9n- 
r n. 
While the denominator is negative, the numerator can be either positive or negative. 
An increase in taxes thus has an ambiguous effect on growth. The reason for this is 
that as the tax rate increases, given the debt/GDP ratio, a higher government spending- 
GDP ratio consistent with the government budget constraint can be reached. Part of 
this additional spending goes on infrastructure which enhances growth. However, taxes 
are distortionary and, for a given real interest rate r, an increase in the tax rate reduces 
savings as a proportion of GDP which depresses private investment and hence growth. 
Let us now look at the effect of the third fiscal policy variable y. Since YB is not a 
function of y, it does not shift due to a shift in y. On the LT curve we assume that the 
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tax rate and debt/GDP ratio remaining constant we will have dn/dy---gýgn- If g, >O and 
g. <O then dn/dy >0. The LT shifts upwards. An increase in the proportion of 
government spending on infrastructure raises the growth rate. We can show 
113N119'YID, -c '- gyfr / frgn-grfn >O 
The result that an increase in the proportion of government spending on investment 
and development purposes raises growth is again in accord with the basic 
characteristics of the growth model presented here. 
5.5. Calibration and estimation for India 
In this section we present the data used and the results obtained. We use the values 
of parameters on the demand side as in the previous chapter to calibrate the above 
model. Other observed variables are those reported in the Economic Survey 1993-94, 
Government of India and Yearbook of the International Financial Statistics published 
by the International Monetary Fund. 
We assume that r. the implicit risk free real interest rate relevant for consumption 
decislons, is 14.16 per cent, the proportion of labour income received by unconstrained 
households is 70 per cent, the probability of death, p, is 0.019 and 6, the rate of time 
preference, is 0.032. 
The Economic Survey 1993-94 reports a rate of growth of population over 1981-91 
to be 2.14 per cent. GDP grew at an average rate of approximately 4.5 per cent over 
this decade. Gross Domestic Private Investment as a percent of GDP for 1991-92 is 
reported to be 14.0 per cent. Consumption as a percent of GDP is calculated to be 64 
per cent ftom the figures provided by the IW. Government spending constitutes 22 
per cent of GDP. The total outlay of the government - Central and State Governments 
II 0- 
and Union Territories is categorised as development and non-development 
expenditure. Non-development expenditure includes defence, tax collection charges, 
police, etc. To analyse the impact of government spending on productivity, we choose 
y to be development expenditure as a proportion of total government expenditure. 
This includes public investment in infrastructure, education and health. Table 1.5 
shows that development spending as a proportion of total government expenditure has 
declined by about 10 per cent in the last decade. and was 54.3 per cent in 1993-94. 
Table 5.1: Summary of Calibration. 
Sources 
Parameter Value 
Depreciation Rate =n0.05 
Real Rate of Interest =r0.14 
Rate of time preference =60.032 
Consumption/GDP =C0.64 
Gov. Exp. /GDP =G0.22 
Gov. Debt/GDP =D0.60 
probability of death p 0.019 
liquidity parameter X 0.70 
rate of growth of population =g 0.0214 
GDP growth =n 0.045 
Development Exp. /Gov. Exp. =y 0.543 
Capital Extemality =yI 
Y2 1-(1-a)yi 
Economic Survey, Government of India, (Various issues), Annual Report, 
Reserve Bank of India, Bombay. 
-x, the rate of depreciation, is chosen to be 5 per cent. 
Depreciation of physical 
capital through technological obsolescence as well as wear and tear may 
be expected 
to be roughly 10 per cent. Our concept of capital is broader and includes 
human as 
103 
well as physical capital. Since we expect a much lower depreciation rate for human 
capital we choose the average depreciation rate for our broad concept of capital to be 
5 per cent. 
yj is the contribution of public capital to the production externality i. e., it is the 
contribution of public capital to the economy-wide efficiency of labour. As yi is neither 
estimated nor observed, it is imposed. Since we do not know its value, we impose 
different values of yj and calibrate the model. To each level of yj corresponds I-Y2 ý'Yl 
(1-cc), the elasticity of aggregate output to public capital stock. The value of cc, the 
share of income accruing to private capital, was revealed to be approximately 29 per 
cent. So the higher is yi the higher is the elasticity I-Y2. 
The marginal products of private and public capital can be shown to be Y2(Y/K) and 
(I -Y2) (Y/ KG). Since the ratio of both public and private investment to GDP is each 
approximately II per cent, the marginal product of private and public capital may be 
compared by comparing the value Of Y2 to (1-Y2)- If Y2 ýI-Y2 i. e. Y2": --0.5, the two 
marginal products are equal and output cannot be increased by reallocating resources 
from the public to the private sector or vice versa. Our calibration shows that (x=0.29 
and Y2=--I-Y2 when y1=0.7. Allocation of capital between public and private sectors is 
then efficient. If (1 -72 )< 0.5 output can be raised by reallocating investment from the 
public to the private sector then size of the public sector is too large. The Table 5.2 
shows the values of the multipliers when the model is calibrated at different values of 
Yi. 
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Table 5.2: The Multipliers for selected values of yj 
Yl O)IVO'y cýtVaD an/&T 
0.2 0.03232 -0.00497 -0.0625 
0.5 0.07678 -0.01202 0.06384 
0.7 0.10404 -0.02174 0.14130 
0.9 0.12960 -0.02772 0.21393 
5.5.1. The Development Expenditure Multiplier 
The development expenditure multiplier, (o-'nl&y), measures the change in long run 
steady state growth rate corresponding to a change in the proportion of development 
expenditure in total government spending when the tax rate and the debt /GDP ratio 
are unchanged. For yl=0.2 a one per cent increase in the proportion of development 
expenditure in government spending leads to an increase in the long-run growth rate by 
0.03 per cent. Similarly if yj were 0.7 the rise in the long-run growth rate would be 0.1 
per cent. A ten per cent reduction in the proportion of development expenditure then 
implies aI per cent decline in the long run growth rate. 
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Figure 5.2 
Any increase in the proportion of public investment to total government spending 
raises the long-term growth rate whatever the efficiency of the public sector. However, 
when yj is higher, a reduction in the ratio of development expenditure to total 
government expenditure reduces growth to a larger extent. This can be seen in Figure 
5.2. The higher is yi, the contribution of the public sector to raising the economy-wide 
efficiency of labour, the greater is the effect on long-term growth of a reduction in the 
proportion of public investment to total government spending. 
5.5.2. The Tax Multiplier 
While growth rates unambiguously increase as debt declines or as government 
spending on infrastructure increases, other things remaining the same, the change in 
growth brought about by a change in the tax rate is not so well defined. The tax 
multiplier, (anlar), measures the change in long-run steady state growth due to a 
change in T, the tax rate, when D and y are unchanged. Given the government budget 
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constraint a rise in the tax rate allows higher public spending and thus investment. 
When yj is high, then a rise in the tax rate which reallocates resources to the public 
sector raises long-term growth rate. The tax multiplier is therefore positive. However, 
when yj is low, higher taxes imply an increase in public investment at the cost of 
private saving which leads to a reduction in private investment. An increase in tax rate 
reduces long-run growth rate when the contribution of the public sector to the growth 
potential of the economy is relatively lower. 
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Figure 5.3 
Figure 5.3 shows how the value of the tax multiplier rises with an increase in yi. We 
see that the sign of the tax rate multiplier changes from negative to positive as yj rises. 
5.5.3. The Debt Multiplier 
The debt multiplier, (65'n/aD), measures the change in long-run steady state growth 
due to a change in D, the debt/GDP ratio, when 'r and y are unchanged. Table 5.2 
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shows that if yi were 0.2, a one per cent increase in the debt/GDP ratio leads to a 
reduction in the long run growth rate by 0.005 per cent. Or, a hundred per cent 
increase in the debt/GDP ratio would reduce growth rate by 0.5 per cent. At yl=0.7 a 
hundred per cent increase in D would reduce the growth rate by 2.17 per cent. 
, yl and the debt multiplier 
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We observe in Figure 5.4 that the absolute value of the multiplier rises when yj Is 
higher and a rise in the debt ratio reduces long-term growth to a larger extent. If taxes 
remain unchanged, then a reduction in debt is achieved by reducing government 
spending. Since development expenditure constitutes nearly half of total government 
spending, the higher is yl, the larger will be the effect of a reduction in debt on long- 
term growth rate. 
As discussed in detail earlier, the ratio of development expenditure in the 
government's total expenditure is rapidly declining in the face of the commitment to 
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reduce public borrowing under the SAP. Our calibration suggests that the effect of the 
decline in the ratio of development expenditure on the growth rate is quite significant. 17) 
Assuming a mean level of yi, reducing the proportion of development spending from 
the present y=54.3 per cent say by another 10 per cent to 44.3 per cent, keeping the 
tax rate and the debt/GDP ratio unchanged, will reduce growth by more than 0.7 per 
cent. The pattern of government spending therefore has a significant effect on the long- 
run growth rate of the economy. For, instance if half of defence expenditure, which is 
about 20 per cent of total government spending, was diverted to development 
purposes y would increase from 54.3 to 64.3 and the long-run growth rate would rise 
by about 0.76 per cent. 
A 0.5 per cent increase in growth could be achieved either by a less than 10 per cent 
rise in the ratio of development expenditure in total expenditure or by a 50 per cent 
reduction in the debt/GDP ratio from the present 0.6. The second is much larger in 
magrutude. Since total government expenditure stands at about 22 per cent of GDP 
and slightly more than half of it is development expenditure, development expenditure 
stands at about 12 per cent of GDP. Thus higher growth to the same extent could be 
achieved by a small increase in development expenditure rather than a large reduction 
in debt. 
The effect of small changes in more than one fiscal variable can be analysed as 
follows. Since we have n=n(D, y,, r), the total effect is given by 
NNN 
dn dD +- dy +- dT . 
If the fiscal deficit Is reduced by rals'ng the tax rate, -c, 
OD C'Y Cn-1 
while the proportion of infrastructure spending to total government spending remains 
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unchanged, then the total effect on long term growth rate can be measured by 
dn = 
cn dD + 
an 
d-,. 
c9D aT 
On the other hand, the tax rate could be kept constant and the fiscal deficit could be 
reduced by cutting public spending. Government expenditure can be reduced either by 
a reduction in both consumption spending and investment such that y remains 
unchanged, or by a reduction in one such that y changes. If, say, the reduction is 
brought about by a cut in the expenditure on infrastructure, because of which y 
changes, the total effect on growth would be dn = 
on dD + 
an 
dy 
. 
Here the first term aD Cly 
is positive since debt has been reduced and the second term is negative since there is a 
fall in y which reduces growth. The total effect on growth depends on which effect is 
larger. 
5.6. Non-Ricardian Effects 
In this section we examine some of the implications that arise from the violation of 
Ricardian assumptions. We first look at the values the tax and debt multipliers would 
take on if the planning horizons of the unconstrained consumers were different. We 
next look at the effect of liquidity constraints. 
5.6.1. Finite horizons 
If the probability of death is higher the effect of the shorter time horizon on the 
consumption of unconstrained consumers is revealed as larger non-Ricardian effects on 
growth rates. Figure 5.5 shows that the absolute value of the debt multiplier increases 
as the probability of death approaches unity. This accords well with our expectation 
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that if consumers have shorter planning horizons then public debt is treated as net 
wealth and consumption rises crowding out private investment and reducing the rate of 
growth in our model. When p=O the value of the multiplier is non-zero because of 
other non-Ricardian effects, namely distortionary taxes, population growth and 
liquidity constraints and the public capital externality. 
Finite horizons and the debt multiplier 
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Similarly the value of the tax multiplier would be higher if the probability of death 
were higher. Shorter time horizons represented by a higher value of p, other 
parameters remaining the same, imply small changes in the tax rate would have much 
larger effects on growth. Again the multiplier is non-zero when p=O because of other 
non-Ricardian effects. This can be seen in Figure 5.6. 
ill 
0.6 
Finite horizons and the tax multiplier 
0.5 
0.4 
CL 
0.3 
E 
x 2 0.2 
0.1 
0 
---7 ax multiplier,, 
C) 04 CO Ict LO (D r- 00 (3) 
ci C) 66C; C) C) C; 
p=the probabilitY of death 
Figure 5.6 
5.6.2. Liquidity constraints 
We now examine the effect of liquidity constraints on the tax multiplier. 
As Figure 5.7 shows the value of the tax multiplier falls as we approach the Ricardian 
case (k=l). This is because if a higher proportion of income is received by forward 
looking consumers then the effect of a change in the tax rate on consumption will be 
lower and the magnitude of crowding out is smaller. Hence the effect of a change in 
the tax rate on the growth rate is smaller. 
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5.6.3. Distortionary Taxes 
To examine the effect of distortionary taxes we assume that p=g=O and k=l as in 
the Ricardian case. Now the deviation from Ricardian Equivalence is due only to 
distortionary taxes and the public capital externality. We re-estimate the multipliers 
at the mean value of yj = 0.5. Table 5.3 shows us how these 'quasi-Ricardian' 
multipliers compare with the non-Ricardian case when there exist finite horizons, 
population growth, liquidity constraints and distortionary taxes. Since the 
development expenditure multiplier is determined on the supply side of the model we 
look at the tax and debt multipliers which would be affected by non-Ricardian effects 
on demand. 
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Table 5.3: The Multipliers for the Quasi Ricardian and Non-Ricardian Cases 
Multiplier Quasi Ricardian Non-Ricardian 
cýlvaD -0.0154 -0.0153 
Cýn/c't 0.0599 0.0638 
The tax and debt multipliers in the Quasi Ricardian case are only marginally 
lower than in the non-Ricardian case. Clearly the effect of finite horizons, population 
growth and liquidity constraints is not very large. We examine the relation between the 
tax rate and the long-run growth rate in Figure 5.8,5.9,5.10 and 5.11. We also look 
at the choice of the tax rate that maximises growth. This is considered to be the 
coptimal' tax rate. 
We first examine the relationship between the tax rate and the growth rate in 
Figure 5.8. yj is assumed to be the mean level of 0.5. Figure 5.8 shows the optimal tax 
rate for different levels of y, the ratio of development to total government spending. 
Given the level of y at 0.54 growth rate can be raised by raising the tax rate to about 
40 per cent. If y were higher by 10 or 20 percentage points, growth rates achieved 
would be relatively higher at any tax rate. 
114 
Growth, Tax Rate and Development Expenditure 
0.09 
0.08 
0.07 
0.06 
0.05 
0.04 
0.03 
I-Iolo, 
0.02 
0.01 
y=0.54 
y=0.64 
Y=0.74 
0 
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 
Tax rate 
Figure 5.8 
As discussed earlier the effect of distortionary taxes on the long-run growth rate 
depends on the contribution of public capital stock to the economy wide efficiency of 
labour. We see that the optimal tax rate is different at different values of yi. Figure 5.9 
indicates that if yj =0.25 the maximum growth rate is achieved when the tax rate is 
around 25 per cent. The higher is yi, the higher is the optimal tax rate. When yj =0.75 
the optimal tax rate is around 57 per cent. 
115 
Growth, Tax Rate and 
Yl 
0.08 
0.07 
0.06 
0.05 
0.04 
(9 0.03 
100.00 
1 
000, 
IN 
0.02 
0.01 
-yl=0.25 
--- yl=0.5 
------- 
yl--0.75 
0 4- 
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 
Tax Rate 
Figure 5.9 
0.6 0.7 
Figure 5.10 shows growth rates at different levels of the tax rate corresponding to the 
debt /GDP ratio. yj is assumed to be the mean level of 0.5. Again growth rate can be 
increased from its present level by raising the tax rate up to about 40 per cent. If the 
debt/GDP ratio is lower then growth rates are relatively higher for all -c. 
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Finally Fig. 5.11 shows the optimal tax rate for different values of the liquidity 
parameter k. It also shows that the effect on growth of changing the proportion of 
income received by unconstrained consumers. It can be seen that this effect is quite 
small. Increasing the proportion of income earned by the rich will not increase growth 
substantially even though they save and the poor don't. If all post-tax labour income 
was to be received by unconstrained consumers ( ?, = 1), the long run growth rate 
would be about 0.2 per cent higher. For the present value of the liquidity parameter of 
70 per cent, the optimal tax rate is about 40 per cent. This is not sigruficantly affected 
by the value of X. 
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The effect of a reduction in debt has been examined above by looking at the 
change in the growth rate induced by small changes in the debt/GDP ratio. The 
multipliers were derived at the current level of the debt/GDP ratio of 0.6. In Figure 
5.12 and Figure 5.13 we observe that if the debt/GDP ratio was considerably reduced 
then the development expenditure and the tax multiplier acquire much higher values. A 
small increase in the proportion of development expenditure in total government 
in the tax rate can raise the long-run steady state growth rate spending or an increase II 
more effectively at lower levels of the debt/GDp ratio. 
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5.8 Effects of Demand and Supply Side externalities 
In this section we impose restrictions on the parameters p, g, k, -c and yj to 
evaluate the relative importance of the non-Ricardian effects for empirical analysis and 
obtain a range of specifications including the 'pure' Ricardian, and models similar to 
Alogoskoufis and van der Ploeg (1990) and Buiter (1991) among others. The 
endogenous growth character of the model is retained throughout by the assumption 
that there are externalities arising from private capital. 
In the 'pure' Ricardian case we assume that there are no public capital 
externalities, no liquidity constraints, no population growth, horizons are infinite and 
taxes are non-distortionary. So p=g= I- X= -i = yj = 0. 
The aggregate consumption function can be shown to be 
I+r 
Ct 
1+(5 
Ct-I 
as in (2.9) which defined the consumption function of a representative agent. In the 
steady state expressing consumption as a ratio of GDP 
«1+n)(l+5)-(1+r»C =O 
Since taxes are lump-sum, the government budget constraint is 
G=T-(r-n)/(I+n)D 
The market equilibrium condition is 
+n) )K - 
The 'Ricardian' equivalent of the 'Yaari-Blanchard' consumption function is 
f(n, r, D) = ((I+n)(1+6)-(I+r))( I- ((n+7r)/(I+n) )K - T+(r-n)/(I+n)D) = 
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Assuming that yi =0 as in Romer (1986) i. e. public capital has no externalities then the 
LT curve becomes 
logB + log K(r) = 
The debt multiplier has been defined as 
[aNlaD] ` -r, y'- grfD-gDfr / frgn-grfn 
In this case9D =0 and if n=r- 5, fDapproaches zero and the debt multiplier approaches 
zero. The tax and development expenditure multipliers are also both zero. In other 
words, when consumers have infinite horizons, there are no liquidity constraints, no 
population growth, taxes are lump sum, public capital has no externalities and the 
growth rate is equal to the real interest rate minus the pure rate of time preference, 
fiscal policy is neutral. 
In the Yaari-Blanchard case when only p#0, and we assume that there are no 
liquidity constraints, population growth or externalities associated with public capital 
and n= r-5, non-Ricardian effects arise as the probability of death is positive. Due to 
finite horizons public debt is considered net wealth and this raises consumption and 
reduces saving which in turn reduces net investment and hence reduces the long run 
growth rate. The restrictions that g=0, X=1, -c = 0, yj =0 and n=r-5, reduce our 
model to the Alogoskoufis and van der Ploeg (1990) specification. As can be seen in 
Table 5.4 if p=0.02 we find that when taxes are lump sum, the value of the debt 
multiplier is -0.0013. Thus a 100 percent decrease in the debt/GDP ratio leads to a 
0.13 percent rise in the growth rate. Our result that in the presence of finite horizons, a 
change in the debt/GDP ratio affects the long-run growth rate, corresponds with their 
conclusions. When finite horizons and population growth are both included in the 
model as in Alogoskoufis and van der Ploeg (1991) and Bulter (1991) the debt 
121 
multiplier becomes -0.00 18. In other words, if in addition to finite horizons we include 
the population growth rate the absolute value of the debt multiplier rises by 0.0005. 
This suggests that the effect of Blanchard-Weil demographics are significant when 
taxes are lump sum and there arise no externalities due to public capital. 
The model incorporates tax distortions in the form of a flat rate income tax 
imposed on all labour and non-labour income as in Barro (1990) and Futagami, Morita 
and Shibata (1993), Jappelli and Meana (1994) and Krichel and Levine (1995). When 
none of the other Ricardian assumptions are violated the debt multiplier is found to be 
non-zero at -0.001. The non-zero effects of government borrowing on long-run 
growth are entirely due to distortionary taxes. We can again look at how the 
multipliers would be affected if there one or more of the other assumptions of the 
Ricardian theorem were violated as well. 
When finite horizons and population growth are incorporated in the model with 
tax distortions the absolute value of the debt multiplier becomes higher. At p=0.02, g 
=0 the value of the debt multiplier is - 0.0027 and at p=0.02, g=0.02 it is -0.0030. 
In comparison with the lump sum tax case these values are nearly double indicating the 
importance of tax distortions. These results suggest that models like Alogoskoufis and 
van der Ploeg (1990,1991) and Buiter (1991) while taking into account effects of 
finite horizons and population growth on the demand side, ignore more important 
demand side non-Ricardian effects due to distortionary taxes. 
When the stock of public capital affects the economy-wide efficiency of labour, 
the effect of fiscal policy on the long-run growth rate is due not only to non-Ricardian 
demand side effects but due to the direct effect of public spending on infrastructure, 
education, health and other development expenditure which creates physical and 
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human capital. We see that the multipliers are much larger in magnitude when the 
externality arising from public spending is taken into account. Our results are 
summarised in Tables 5.4,5.5 and 5.6. At yl=0.5 the tax multiplier is now positive 
which indicates that higher taxes that finance public investment serve to raise growth, 
outweighing negative demand side effects. 
Table 5.4: The Debt Multiplier 
Case Distortion Lump sum axes Distortionary Taxes 
Pure Ricardian None 0 -0.001 
Finite Horizons p=0.02 -0.0013 -0.0027 
Finite Horizons and p=0.02 -0.0018 -0.0030 
Population Growth g=0.02 
Public Capital yj = 0.5 -0.0065 -0.0061 
Externality 
Finite Horizons and yj = 0.5 -0.0074 -0.0074 
Public Capital p 0.02 
Externality 
Finite Horizons, yj 0.5 -0.0078 -0.0079 
Population Growth p 0.02 
and Public Capital g 0.02 
Externality 
Liquidity yj 0.5 
3 
-0.0088 
Constraints, Finite k 0.7 
Horizons, p 0.02 
Population Growth g 0.02 
and Public Capital 
Externality 
2 We set r=0.077 so that n= r- 5. All other parameters retain their previous values. 
' in the care when we have lump sum taxes and liquidity constraints \ke need to 
deterimne the share of taxes paid by the two gotips ot 
consumers. Since there is no evidence for this we avoid imposing an arbitru-), value and so 
do not calculate this multiplier. 
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Table 5.5: The Tax Multiplier 
Case Distortion Distortionary Taxes 
Pure Ricardian None -0.0478 
Finite Horizons p=0.02 -0.0481 
Finite Horizons and p=0.02 -0.0764 
Population Growth g=0.02 
Public Capital yj = 0.5 0.1267 
Externality 
Finite Horizons and yj = 0.5 0.1305 
Public Capital p 0.02 
Externality 
Finite Horizons,, yj 0.5 0.1168 
Population Growth p 0.02 
and Public Capital g 0.02 
Externality 
Liquidity yj 0.5 0.1196 
Constraints, Finite ?, 0.7 
Horizons, p 0.02 
Population Growth g 0.02 
and Public Capital 
Externality 
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Table 5.5: The Development Expenditure Multiplier 
Case Distortion Lump sum Taxes Distortionary Taxes 
Pure Ricardian None 0 0 
Finite Horizons p=0.02 0 0 
Finite Horizons and p=0.02 0 0 
Population Growth g=0.02 
Public Capital yj = 0.5 0.0850 0.0710 
Externality 
Finite Horizons and yj = 0.5 0.0858 0.0726 
Public Capital p 0.02 
Externality 
Finite Horizons, yj 0.5 0.0874 0.0754 
Population Growth p 0.02 
and Public Capital g 0.02 
Externality 
Liquidity yj 0.5 0.0765 
Constraints, Finite ?, 0.7 
Horizons, p 0.02 
Population Growth g 0.02 
and Public Capital 
Externality 
When we include only the externality due to public capital then the value of the 
debt multiplier is -0.0065, while if we include all the non-Ricardian demand side effects 
due to finite horizons, population growth, tax distortions and liquidity constraints it is 
-0.0088. This means that the effect of a ten per cent reduction in growth rate would 
raise the long run growth rate in the first case by 0.065 per cent and in the second by 
0.088 per cent. By ignoring non-Ricardian demand side effects, though they have been 
found to exist, the anticipated change in the long run growth rate would not be very 
different. From the current level of 4.5 per cent it is anticipated to rise to 4.5088, when 
demand side effects are included and 4.5065 when they are ignored. Even in the case 
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of development expenditure and the tax rate, there is only a marginal change in the 
value of the multiplier when these effects are ignored. 
The strongest effects arise from public capital externalities, and in their absence 
from tax distortions. Our results thus appear to suggest that in an enclogenous growth 
model which takes into account strong supply side effects caused by externalities 
ansing from public investment, ignoring non-Ricardian effects on the demand side 
would not significantly affect our results. Ignoring Blanchard-Weil demographics may 
on the one hand lead to loss of generality and perhaps reduce the accuracy of our 
results, but more may be gained by the analytical simplicity achieved by making 
Ricardian assumptions on the demand side. 
5.9. Conclusion 
Our analysis reveals the significance of the violations of Ricardian assumptions. Our 
results indicate that though non-Ricardian effects are potentially significant the effect 
of population growth, finite horizons and liquidity constraints does not change our 
results drastically. 
The major policy implications that arise from the above results are that the growth 
rate of the Indian economy can be raised most effectively by either raising the tax rate 
or by raising the Proportion of development expenditure. The tax rate can be raised 
effectively by bringing into the fold of the tax structure those sectors that at present 
enjoy exemption. Rationalising the tax system while widening the tax base could be 
more effective in raising the proportion of income that is paid as taxes. As we have 
discussed earlier, there is an attempt to strean-dine, restructure and rationalise the tax 
structure under the SAP. 
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On the other hand, there is no attempt to raise development expenditure. On the 
contrary, y has declined in this period. Cutting public investment is going to reduce the 
long term growth potential of the economy. Such a policy is counter-productive and 
though there seems to be a general awareness of the implications of reducing public 
investment, it is still being followed to meet the government's commitment under the 
SAP to cut deficit. Clearly, the emphasis needs to shift from simply cutting the deficit, 
to cutting it by reducing non-development expenditure and to diverting spending from 
government consumption to public investment. Unless the policy framework of the 
SAP clearly defines the role of public investment and takes into account the effect of 
government Policies on long-run growth, borrowing countries concerned might 
continue to follow such counter-productive policies. A clear definition of the role of 
public investment and its contfibution to the economy wide efficiency of labour can 
prove to be a step towards raising the long-run steady state growth rate in the 
economy. 
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Conclusion 
In this thesis we examine the effects of fiscal policy on the long-run steady state 
growth rate in the fi7amework of an enclogenous growth model of India. We first exarnine 
the Ricardian hypothesis that predicts that fiscal policy has no effect on consumption and 
private investment in an economy. Next we estimate non-Ricardian effects on the demand 
side and calibrate our model which has public capital externalities on the supply side to 
determine the impact of changes in tax rate, debt /GDP ratio and the proportion of 
government spending on development on the long-run steady state growth rate of the 
economy. 
Since Ricardian Equivalence predicts that fiscal policy is neutral we first examine 
the Ricardian model for India. Underlying the Ricardian equivalence theorem is the 
permanent income hypothesis and the assumption that there are no credit market 
imperfections. Liquidity constraints magnify the response of current consumption to current 
income. Our results suggest an 'exces sensitivity' of consumption to disposable income in 
India. This implies that the Ricardian assumption of perfect credit markets Is Violated for 
India. 
The representative agent model prevents us fi7om analysing the effect on 
consumption of a transfer of population between the forward looking permanent income 
consumers whom we cafl "unconstrained" and those who consume their current income the 
CC constrained". We, therefore, describe an aggregate consumption function that allows for 
both groups of consumers to exist in one population and for there to be a transfer between 
the groups. The unconstrained consumers have a constant probability of death that can lie 
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between zero and one. They own all the physical and financial wealth m the economy, have 
access to credit and they smooth consumption over their lifetimes. If we define their 
probability of death p as zero then they would represent Barro's inýte horizon consumers. 
The liquidity parameter, X, represents the fact that in an economy, especially in a 
poor developing country not aH consumers can be described as unconstrained as they do 
not have access to credit. The transfer of consumers fi7om one group to another can come 
about, for instance, by a liberalisation of the credit market or by a redistribution of income 
and wealth. The parameter of population growth of unconstrained consumers, g, captures 
the change in the consumption pattern of an economy undergoing structural transformation. 
An interesting result that emerged from our results was the value of g that was 
estimated to be -0.12. The negative value suggests a net transfer from the unconstrained to 
the constrained group for the period under consideration. Our estimate indicates income 
redistfibution that is unfavourable to some sections of the population in the penod 1960-80. 
Figures for rural income distribution and poverty levels suggest that India's process of 
development, with its emphasis on large-scale capital-intensive industry and modernisation 
of agriculture in selected pockets of the country, has been accompanied by paupensation of 
a section of the peasantry. This hypothesis is also supported by the evidence of a rise in the 
aggregate savings ratio and the build-up of food stocks. 
Production externalities in our model anse from the effect of public and private 
capital on the economy-vvide efficiency of laboUr. Capital is defined in a broad sense to 
include inffastructure and human capital. Public spending on educattorý health, 1mgation, 
transport, telecommunications, etc., is part of government spending on capital formation. In 
India the public sector was envisaged to have a crucial role in the planning process that 
aimed to speed up the rate of economic growth. Fiscal policy was regarded 
by planners and 
129 
Policy makers as an important tool in India's development strategy. Public investment 
intended to proVide both the physical infi7astructure and the human capital required for 
economic growth. In recent years, however, the rising burden of government consumption 
expenditure and higher interest payments has squeezed the resources available for 
development expenditure. The government's commitment to development expenditure has 
been further unden-nined under the Structural Adjustment Programme. Since on the one 
hand, there is no clearly defined role for public investment, and on the other there is 
pressure to cut total spending and reduce deficits, we observe that in recent years there has 
been a reduction in the proportion of development expenditure in total government 
spending. 
We analysed the effect of fiscal measures - changes in the debt/GDP ratio, the tax 
rate and the proportion of development expenditure in total government spending on the 
objective of economic growth in a steady state model of endogenous growth. The 
significance of the non-Ricardian effects observed earlier is examined in our analysis of the 
effect of fiscal changes. Our results indicate that though potentially the effect of finite 
horizons, liquidity constraints and population growth can be important, the effect of these 
non-Ricardian assumptions is marginal. The strongest non-Ricardian effects arise from 
distortionary taxes. When fiscal policy has a strong impact on growth, due the externalities 
arising fi7om public investment, the only significant demand side non-Ricardian effect 
originates fi7om tax distortions. The multipliers are relatively insensitive to the presence of 
finite horizons, population growth and liquidity constraints in the model. In terms of 
modelling strategy this suggests that while achieVing analytical simplicity by ignoring them 
we will not lose much in terms of empirical application. Although we detect the presence of 
firýite horizons at the estimated value of the parameter it has ve'Y n-unor implications for 
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growth. This suggests that in future research we can assume that Barro's assumptions for 
household behaviour hold without a loss of generality. In other words, the contribution of 
this study in ten-ns of modelling strategy fies in not just imposing the demand side effects 
but estimating the consumption function to detennine them, to assess the impact of the 
non-Ricardian effects for fiscal policy analysis and show which of them have important 
implications for growth. 
The multipfiers, derived suggest that a reduction in the debt/GDP ratio leads to an 
increase in the long-run growth rate. The effect of the tax rate is ambiguous. When the 
contribution of public capital to the economy-wide efficiency of labour is high an increase in 
the tax rate increases the long-run rate of economic growth. If, however, the contribution 
of the public sector is low compared to that of private investment then an increase in the tax 
rate which reduces private investment, has a negative effect on the long-run growth rate. 
When the contribution of public capital to the economy-, Aide efficiency of labour is greater 
than that of private capital, then reducing the tax rate will decrease the growth rate. The 
effect of reducing the proportion of public investment in government spending on the long- 
run growth rate is always found to be negative. In our cafibration for India we find that the 
magnitude of the development expenditure multiplier is nearly six times the value of the 
debt/GDP ratio multiplier. Whatever the contribution of public capital to the economy-vAde 
efficiency of labour, the effect of a change in public Investment is positive. If the objective 
is to achieve a higher rate of long-run economic growth in India, a reduction in pubfic 
investment is clearly contrary to this objective. 
The explanation of why the proportion of public investment in total government 
spending is faffing sharply under the SAP despite Its negative effect on growth, could be 
that the emphasis in a SAP is on short-terrn macroeconomic balance rather than growth. As 
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distinct from the 1XV, the World Bank, whose horizon for an adjustment programme is 
usually longer, emphasises supply side measures. Recently, it has also been emphasising the 
role of human capital. To take account of this, government spending on health and 
education in India has been increased in the last two years. Also, it is proposed that a Poficy 
Framework Paper be drafted jointly by the borrowing government, the INV and the World 
Bank. The objective is to achieve a better balance between and short term goals of the ROF 
and the objective of long-run growth. 
The major limitation of the framework adopted in this study is that it is a closed 
economy model. While this may be acceptable for India at the present level of 
development, such a model may not approximate reality for another country or for India in 
the future. A closed economy model prevents us fi7om analysing the effect of inflow and 
outflow of capital to and from the country. Since capital is not homogenous, this is not a 
triVial issue. For example, the inflow may be of foreign capital which comes with new 
technology and contributes significantly to the economy-vride efficiency of labour. The 
outflow may be of highly educated technical and scientific personnel like engineers and 
doctors ('brain drain') whose training has involved significant investment. 
Research in endogenous growth theory is opening up many avenues. For 
instance, we could follow Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) in analysing the effect of 
technology diffusion through imitation and/or foreign investment. Intellectual property 
fights could be granted by a government to foreign investors if spill-over effects on 
growth of the profit flow were higher than of technology diffusion through irnItation of 
designs. Though many issues relating to open economy models have not been settled 
satisfactorily, there are attempts to solve them. Barro and Sala-l-Martin 
(1995) 
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introduce credit constraints on international borrowing, variations in the time 
preference parameter and adjustment costs to deal with some issues. 
We could also explore the possibility of extending the above model to examine 
the impact of military expenditure on growth rate. In a similar model Berthelemy et. 
al. (1995) analyse the interrelationships between military expenditure and growth in a 
model where investment in education creates skilled labour which increases the 
endogenously determined rate of growth. Since both education and defence are non- 
rival in use,, they are public goods and have to be financed by taxation. Therefore there 
is a trade-off between them. By raising security defence contributes to social welfare. 
But if it leads to lower civilian spending which is also assumed to contribute to welfare 
then the total effect may be either way. There is thus a case for analysing both 
economic growth and welfare in a framework that incorporates defence and 
development expenditure. In our model development expenditure (which includes 
education) serves to raise the overall efficiency of labour in the economy and therefore 
contributes to growth. We could also take into account spill-over effects from 
investment in military R&D and defence related infrastructure in the aggregate 
production function. Both development expenditure and defence expenditure then 
contribute to growth. Since here externalities would arise from private capital and 
public infrastructure as well as education and defence spending the model would be 
broader in its analysis. Also, if it is assumed that public investment in health, education, 
infrastructure, etc. raise the quality of life of the population then it could be included in 
the social welfare function. We could then study the impact of military expenditure on 
growth and welfare as in Berthelemy et. al. (1995) but incorporating a wider range of 
phenomena. 
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In this study we have demonstrated the applicability of recent developments in 
macroeconomics to issues of growth and development in LDCs in just one aspect - that of 
fiscal policy. The scope of our study is however much larger - for example, endogenous 
growth theory has a bearing on many issues relating to technology diffusion, intellectual 
property rights, the migration of labour, and so on. No doubt, the next few years will 
witness a boom in research in many of these aspects of development within the framework 
of enclogenous growth models. 
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Appendix A 
The Yaari-Blanchard and Linear Technology Curves 
Here we examine the slope of the The Yaan-Blanchard and Linear Technology 
curves. Consider incremental changes in the exogenous fiscal variables dD, ft, dy and 
the corresponding incremental changes dn and dr along the YB and LT curves. 
Differentiating, these incremental changes satisfy 
fndn+fr dr +fDdD +fzd-c =O 
9ndn +grdr+gDdD+grd-c + g7d7--O 
Hence keeping fiscal policy and income distribution fixed, the slope of the YB curve is 
given by 
(O'War)f-ý-o'::::: '-fr/ fn 
fn=-(1+8)C-ý(K+D)<O 
From (5.29) ýC-TI(D+K)=O 
since C>O, K+D>O, and 71=(p+g)(p+6)(I +r(I -, u))/(l -p) >0, so 
ý=r(l-, u)-5-n(1+5)>O. Note that if p+g=O then ý=O. Also from (5.29) we have 
fr=ý(D-[(n+Tc)/(l +n)](I --c))K'(r))+C(I +g)(I -, r)- {(p+6)(p+g)(I --T)/(l -p) I 
(D+K(r))-, q 
K'(r)>O 
Since fn <0 and fr >0 therefore - fr/fn > 0. In other words, (c-rdcr)f. 0 >0 or the 
YB 
curve is upward sloping. 
Turning to the LT curve when fiscal policy is given, its slope is given by 
gn 
9n"::: ý(1-Y2*1+r)D /(I+n)2 G)-(l / (n+7r))+ I 
/(I +n)] 
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gr'Y2 {K'(r) I/ (K(r) I -(I -Y2)(D/ G+( -cTcK'(r) ý/ G) 
Hence gn": ýO and gr": ýO if D<G/n+7c and -c-K<GK(r)y2/( I -Y2). For G=O. 3 and n+7c<O .I the 
first of these conditions is satisfied if D<3 (i. e., a debt/GDP ratio less than 300%). We 
expect y2 >1/2, -c<0.5 and Tc<O. l (on an annual basis). If G=0.3 again, the second 
condition is satisfied if K<6, not a stringent condition. From these considerations we 
deduce that, under very lax conditions, the LT cuirve is downward-slo ping. 
The remaining partial derivatives are 
fD=(r-n)/( 1 +n)-i 
f, =-r(I +g)C-ý(l -TcK+k(l -a))+{(p+g)(p+6)/(l -p) I r(D+K) 
g, r= {(I -y2)(I -TcK) /G 
9D=-(I-y2)(r-n)G/(I+n) 
gy: --"': ( I -Y2)/ Y 
From these results we can unambiguously sign 9D<O and gy>0. We require 
-nK(r))>O to obtain positive consumption which gives 
fr<O and g., >O. Finally along f--O 
we have that fD=, qV/C(r-n)-TI. Hence fD<O if r-n < 
C/V which requires extraordinarily 
>0. 
large capitaUGDP and debt/GDP ratios to violate. To summarise we expect 
f,, g,, gy 7 
fn, fD, fc, gn, gir, gD 
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Appendix B 
The Data Set 
Year CONS GDP GOVC POP CPI EX 
1951 8648 9966 560 360.18 26.2 716 
1952 9327 9774 590 366.3 25.9 578 
1953 9108 13638 600 372.75 26.8 531 
1954 9735 10073 640 379.57 25.5 593 
1955 8825 10258 670 386.62 24.3 609 
1956 8838 12217 720 394.22 26.5 605 
1957 10174 12598 790 402.23 28 561 
1958 10528 14034 920 410.69 29.3 581 
1959 11617 14793 990 419.61 30.3 640 
1960 11970 16201 1090 429.02 31.2 642 
1961 12520 17177 1210 439 31.8 660 
1962 13180 18476 1460 451.01 32.7 685 
1963 14730 21237 1880 462.03 33.6 793 
1964 17530 24765 2010 472.13 33.8 816 
1965 18530 26145 2300 482.71 41.7 810 
1966 21770 29571 2500 493.39 46.4 1157 
1967 26220 34611 2790 504.34 52.6 1199 
1968 26240 36674 3050 515.6 54.2 1358 
1969 28510 40387 3420 527.18 55.1 1413 
1970 29800 43163 3800 539.08 57.9 1535 
1971 32100 46247 4460 551.23 59.8 1608 
1972 35130 51005 4750 563.53 62.9 1971 
1973 42870 62007 5100 575.89 74.1 2523 
1974 51910 73235 6140 588.3 94.7 3329 
1975 52750 78761 7350 600.76 100 4036 
1976 54110 84894 8210 613.27 92.2 5142 
1977 62530 96067 8670 625.82 100 5408 
1978 68670 104190 9620 646 102.5 5726 
1979 74290 114356 11030 660 109 6418 
1980 99080 136013 13080 675 121.6 6711 
1981 113560 159760 15360 690 137.3 7806 
1982 125460 178132 18270 705 148.1 8803 
1983 145610 207589 21140 720 165.6 9771 
1984 160320 231387 24350 736 179.5 11744 
1985 174380 261920 29260 750.86 189.4 10895 
1986 196600 291974 35070 766.14 205.9 12452 
1987 201060 332616 41330 781.37 224.1 15674 
1988 261600 394992 47200 796.6 245.4 20232 
1989 289640 442769 53070 811.82 261.1 27658 
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YEAR IIN4 DEBT DEF PSI GSI 
1951 890 0 775 259 
1952 702 76 859 303 
1953 610 181 603 256 
1954 700 367 572 292 
1955 774 3083 351 652 436 
1956 841 3514 398 917 499 
1957 1035 4124 677 1225 666 
1958 906 4629 734 1107 833 
1959 961 5137 697 922 815 
1960 1122 6121 649 1214 900 
1961 1090 6573 600 1441 1142 
1962 1131 7230 880 1533 1147 
1963 1223 7970 1090 1606 1445 
1964 1349 8490 1170 1848 1681 
1965 1409 9140 1240 2121 1948 
1966 2078 10580 1720 2211 2216 
1967 2008 10960 1460 3181 2135 
1968 1909 11580 1080 3376 2331 
1969 1582 12230 1020 3373 2167 
1970 1634 13380 1360 4217 2259 
1971 1825 14590 1600 4571 2808 
1972 1867 16820 2180 5256 3290 
1973 2955 18400 1700 4983 3740 
1974 4519 17400 2360 6578 4751 
1975 5265 20130 3200 8918 5557 
1976 5074 22160 3690 8823 7583 
1977 6020 28110 3790 9192 8584 
1978 6811 30580 5080 11171 7846 
1979 9143 36780 6300 13335 9883 
1980 12549 45340 8860 14327 11818 
1981 13608 52770 8730 16686 11767 
1982 14293 67360 10730 23232 16781 
1983 15831 74680 13330 20684 20100 
1984 17134 88780 17580 22680 20381 
1985 19658 108360 22250 23873 24915 
1986 20096 131540 27200 33890 29056 
1987 22244 153290 27880 33210 34020 
1988 28235 180170 33090 40720 34666 
1989 35328 208770 29230 55218 39149 
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CONS Private household Consumption 
GDP Gross domestic Product 
GOVC Government Consumption Expenditure 
POP Population 
CPI Consumer Price Index 
EX Exports 
IM Imports 
DEBT Domestic Public Debt 
DEF Fiscal Deficit 
PSI Private Sector Investment 
GSI Public Investment 
At current prices 
11)9 
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